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THE CONGRESS AND TREATY OF PARIS, 1856.
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.
I. Causes of the Crimean War.
Internal Conditions in Turkey .
In 1785 the national finances of Turkey had become so com-
plicated that it was arranged to issue interest bearing bonds
to Ottoman subjects giving certain resources of the Empire
as a guarantee of their payment. This was in imitation of the
financial methods in vogue in Western Europe, and under good
management should have been successful. But three years later
forced loans and debased currency were resorted to with their
usual result - greater distress among the poor and no real
gain for the government. This second step was one of retro-
gression, since these questionable methods had been repudiated
by strong European Governments in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. When in 1792 Turkey closed a five years' war with
Russia, it was conceded that the failure of the former was due
largely to the penury of her treasury."'" The first reforming
Sultan, Selim III., attempted to bring the finances of his
government to a firm basis, but with little success, and "These
endeavors were continued with scarcely better results by each
of the succeeding Sultans up to the time of the Crimean War,
and during the whole of the period the financial embarrassment
of the empire was extreme." 2 The Spectator for March 19th,
1. Encyclopoedia Britannica, 11th ed. Vol. XXVII, p. 451.
2. Ibid.

21853, after summing up the whole situation in Turkey at that
time, makes the significant statement, "Over all the complica-
3
tions of the Divan hangs the financial question. " At the
beginning of the Crimean War her allies assisted Turkey to the
extent of a loan of t 3,000,000, and in 1855 this loan was in-
creased to L 8,000,000.
Turnins; now to the political conditions in Turkey, for
many years foreign wars had been uniformly unsuccessful, and
added to this, her subjects had been given to frequent insur-
rection. As a nation she had been knocked about in any and
every uncomplimentary way. She had "acquiesced in the in-
compatible pretensions" which hussia and Prance had alternately
forced upon her. And now that England had apparently checked
France, Russia was left to press her case more vigorously. "And,
seeing that Turkey grows manifestly weaker, writers in this
country have grgued that it could not be helped if Turkey were
despatched for partition between the two neighboring empires,
3. The Spectat or, Mar. 19th, 1853. p. 267. "New rumours spring
up almost daily respecting the critical state of Turkey, Prince
Menzschikoff reached Constantinople on the 28th of February,
he visited the Sultan on the 2nd of March, but abstained from
communicating with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the
3rd, Puad hffendi placed his resignation in the bands of the
Sultan; on the 6th it ?;as accepted, and Riffaat Pasha was
appointed to the Poreign Office. Then we hear, that on the
demand of the Grand Vizier, the Charge' d' Affaires of England
has sent despatches to Admiral Dundas, commanding the fleet
in the Mediterranean, at present at Malta, requesting him to come
with all convenient speed, and to anchor in the Archipelago'/
The Vienna correspondent of the T inie
s
,
writing on the 12th,
reports as follows on the departure of the late French Minister:
"Before M.de Lavalette left Constantinople, he received the
second class of the Meshid order from the Sultan, and Mehemet
Ali Pasha presented to him a ring of the value of 30,000 piastres,

3Russia and Austria - her 'heirs' as they are called in Vienna."
But the most important preliminary question, after all,
so far as the present essay is concerned, is the religious
atmosphere in the Ottoman Empire at that time. In the absence
of definite records for the particular period those of a little
later date are used, in the belief that the records furnished
approximate the truth for the period in question. Until 1876
the Government of Turkey was a theocratic, absolute monarchy,
the Sultan being accounted a caliph or successor of the prophet
5Mohammed. It was estimated in 1910 that 50 percent of the
population were of the Mohammedan faith; 41 percent of the
Orthodox church; 6 percent of the Catholic church; and 3 per-
cent of Jews and other religious faiths. While the Government
3. (con't). for Madame de Lavalette. It is currently reported
that Prince Menzschikoff ' s adjutant brought the news to Con-
stantinople on the 25rd, that his superior was only waiting
at Odessa for the departure of M. de Lavalette, and purposed
leaving for Constantinople on the 2nd of March. The French
Ambassador, who, by his impetuosity in the matter of the Holy
Shrines, has got himself and the Porte into difficulties, was
fated to receive a parting insult from his proteges. The
vessel on board of which he was entered the Dardanelles a little
before sunset; a lev; minutes after the sun had gone down, she
was about to continue her voyage, but a couple of shots from
the castles of the Dardanelles at once gave the Captain to
understand that he would not be permitted to depart until sun-
rise. The want of consideration shown by the Turks is said to
have much incensed the diplomatist. It is positively asserted
at Constantinople, that a Russian army-corps- is close to the
Moldavian frontier, and a great part of the Russian fleet pre-
pared to sail from Sebastopol. Since General Leiningen *s
appearance among them the Turks have grown nervous.
Over all the complications of the Divan hangs the financial
question.
"
4. The Spectator , Mar. 12, 1853, Editorial, pp. 237-8.
5. i:ncyc. Brit., 11th ed. Vol. 27, p. 246.

4and a majority of the people were Mohammedans,, yet the Sultan
was not short in promises to tolerate and to protect his Christian
subjects. And, had his Christian subjects been united, they
probably would have had little cause for complaint. But France
had secured a pledge from Turkey that the former should be
"Protector of the Holy Places" and have supervision of the
Catholics in Turkey. ^ This concession to France became a great
offense to Russia; for, although the members of the Orthodox
church numbered almost seven times as many as did those of the
Catholic church, and although Russia had frequently and stren-
uously endeavored to secure a like concession in fnvor of the
Orthodox church, nothing had been accomplished.
The "Eastern Question "
In considering this question the ambitions of Russia and
Austria naturally come first. As mentioned above, it was be-
lieved at Vienna that Russia and Austria were the 'heirs' of
the Ottoman tmplre, which they confidently believed was very
near its dissolution. For this reason they were both keeping
a watchful eye on conditons there with the hope of profiting
by them in the near future. The whole matter became so open
and so public that Czar Nicholas talked freely on the subject
to Lord Aberdeen, Sir Robert Peel, and the Duke of Wellington,
on the occasion of a visit to London in 1844. In his speech
he referred to the Ottoman Empire, as the "sick man". And
again, in 1853, when Sir Hamilton Seymour was serving as British
6. The Spectator
,
Mar. 12, 1853, Editorial p. 237-8.

5Ambassador at St. Petersburg the Czar once more raised the sub-
ject of the dismemberment of Turkey when talking with him.
'
Because Turkey was or "seemed to be in' a state of irretrievable
prostration" and because of a "prophecy that in the year 1853,
when four centuries would have elapsed from the taking of
Constantinople, the Turkish empire would be overthrown,"^ he
felt it his duty to arrange matters with the diplomatic repre-
sentatives at his court. In doing this he defined his position
by saying that he did not contemplate a permanent occupation
of Constantinople; but that he would not tolerate its being
held by Great Britain, France, or any other great nation. Equally,
also, was he opposed to a reconstruction of the Byzantine Empire,
or an extension of Greece so as to make it a powerful State; and,
even more strongly, was he opposed to the "breaking up of Turkey
into little republics, asylums for the Kossuths and Mazzinis."^
Even after the war had begun, it seems that the Russian
people were fully committed to the work as a part of their des-
tiny, to overrun the Turkish Empire and make it a part of their
own. "The war was regarded by many as a kind of crusade - even
the jimperor spoke about the defense of 'the native soil and the
holy faith 1 - and the most exaggerated expectations were enter-
tained of its results. The old Eastern Question was at last to
be solved in accordance with Russian aspire tions, and Nicholas
was about to realize Catharine II. 1 s grand scheme of driving the
7. Fyffe, Mod , ^urope , Vol. Ill, p. 187.
8. Dyer and Hassall, Hist . of Mod . Europe, Vol. VI. p. 117-8.
9. Ibid. Hist, of Mod . Europe"
,
To 1 . fi? p. 117-8.

6Turks out of Europe." 10
But it is not human, especially not European, for England
and France to look on complacently in such emergencies without
a desire to check the aggressor. And, as already mentioned,
France had taken steps to secure concessions which gave her an
excellent opportunity to interfere very materially with Russians
plans. That she was ready and anxious to do so will be readily
admitted when we reflect that Russia had been the leading member
of the coalition against her during the closing years of the
Napoleonic Wars. Besides, she had d;/nestic reasons, for the
Czar had refused to recognize Napoleon III. in that he had
addressed Napoleon as "my dear friend", when diplomatic usage
would have required him to say "my brother." This unwillingness
on the part of the Czar to recognize Napoleon's right as ruler
of France kept alive in the latter' s mind the fact that some of
his own people were not reconciled to him, and made him feel the
necessity of doing some great deed that would cause them to for-
get the past and to look upon him only as the hero of that
glorious event.
As for England, she was further from the scene of action,
but she had vital interests there, nevertheless. Besides, she
looked upon such an extension of Russian territory and power as
unwarranted. Therefore, when the Czar in 1844 and 1853, as
above related, was trying to arrange for a dismemberment of
Turkey, by which England was to get certain portions, his pro-
positions were all rejected. Moreover, preparations were made to
10. Wallace, Russia, p. 436.

7see that the ambitions of the Czar should not he realized.
Two Groups of Demands Made by Russia upon Turkey .
Since the eleventh century when the Crusades began, there
had been difficulties without number in regard to the sites of
the monuments of early Christianity in the whole of that terri-
tory known as Syria, east of the Mediterranean Sea and under
the control of the Ottoman Empire. And, as remarked before,
France had secured a concession from Turkey by which the former
was to be the "Protector of the 'Holy Places".'-1- 1 But Russia
considered that the Treaty of Kainarji of 1774 was not being
kept by Turkey. By this treaty Turkey had agreed "to protect
the Christian relic ion and its churches." 1^ No doubt, Russia
objected to the Turkish method of subletting the contract to
France
.
As reported above, about 47 percent of the whole population
of the Ottoman Empire were Christians, end these were nearly
all members of the Orthodox church; yet France had more privileges
in directing the small minority, who were Roman Catholics, than
Russia had for the majority. This was not a new condition of
affairs; it had been a source of annoyance and dispute for years.
The Spectator
,
quoting the Gazette of St. Petersburg, says,
"Count Nesselrode declares that there is not one word of truth
in the pretension which the newspapers have tried to fasten on
Russia that she desires 'fresh territorial aggrandizement,' or
11. The Spectator, Mar. 12, 1853, Editorial, p. 237-8.
12. Fyffe, Mod . Europe , Vol. Ill* p. 188.

8seeks 'the ruin and destruction of the Ottoman Empire'." Con-
tinuing, Count Nesselrode declares that the only purpose in
vie?; is the protection of the "Holy Places" and the Christians
belonging to the Orthodox church.
This protest was made before any act of diplomatic or of
warlike character had occurred to indicate definitely that war
was inevitable. But that his protest had little weight is shown
by the events of the next few years as well as by statements
indicating that fact to be found in the numerous publications
in London. For instance, when the war was over and Alexander
IL had published a proclamation to his people, The Times ha.d
this to say on the point in question: "But when the late
Monarch, who was the sole cause of the war, is said to have
been 'a stranger to all interested views', and only anxious to
protect the rights of his own church, it is necessary at cnce
to record a protest against the assumption Those who
would persuade us of the Czar's disinterestedness must think
that we have forgotten history. Scarcely any war with Turkey
has been commenced by a ruler at St. Petersburg without the
condition of the Rayahs being brought forward as among the
causes of justification. Yet one province after another has
been wrested from the Turks, and the world has seen the addi-
tion of Greeks, Armenians, Tartars, and Circassians to the
Russian Empire, as a result of contests commenced nominally in
behalf of the Christians throughout the East."'1" 4
13. The Spectator , June 25, 1853, p. 603-5.
14. The Times, April 11, 1856, p. 9.

Acts of Diplomacy Leading to V;ar .
Czar Nicholas first mobilized a part of his army and navy
and then sent Prince Menschikoff as his special Ambassador to
the Sultan at Constantinople. He was instructed to protest
that the Orthodox Christians in the Holy City had been slighted
and that the Koman Catholics had been given privileges with-
held from the former; which acts, he was to declare, were a
breach of the Treaty of Kainarji of 1774. And further he was
to demand "the exclusive protection of all the members of the
Greek church in Turkey, and the settlement of the question re-
specting the Holy Places, on terms which would have left the
15
supremacy to the Greeks." These demands, no doubt, seemed
proper enough to the Czar, since so large a proportion of the
Christian population belonged to his church. And under ordinary
circumstances, had the message been delivered in strictly first
class diplomatic form he would have secured, in all probability
all that was asked. But just here unforeseen diffculties arose.
Before Prince Menschlkoff had secured an audience with the
Sultan, the English Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Strat-
ford de Kedcliffe, visited the former and persuaded him to
separate his demands into two groups, and then to ask the Sultan
for a settlement of the group concerning the Holy Pieces first.
This Prince Menschikoff did and the Sultan promptly complied.
The former thought he had the latter bluffed and the latter
thought he had granted all that was reasonable; while Lord
15. Dyer and Hsssall, Hist . of Mod. nurope
, Vol. VI..,p. 118.
16. The Spectator, May 21, 1853, p. 482.

10
Stratford chuckled over the prospect of the next move. Prince
Menschikoff now boldly and rudely demanded a protectorate over
all the Orthodox Christians of the Empire, who at that time,
May, 1853, numbered no less than 12,000,000 people.
Lord Stratford had once been sent to St. Petersburg as an
Ambassador, but had been rejected by the Czar, and he now took
occasion to "return the compliment" by suggesting to the Sultan
that he reject Prince Menschikoff f s ultimatum. The French
Ambassador also assured the Sultan of support; therefore, it is
no wonder that with such friends as England and France, the reply
to Prince Menschikoff 1 s haughty ultimatum was easily determined
and a rejection delivered by the Sultan. But whether Prince
Menschikoff acted as he did only through ignorance of the real
state of mind of the Sultan and of diplomatic etiquette is not
quite clear. Some profess to believe that he did his undiplo-
matic acts purposely in order to cause a rupture; but as he is
reported es "a mere child in diplomacy", it is quite possible
1 7
the motive may have been mistaken. The Times says, "it is
probable that by the violence and indiscretion of PRINCE
MjiMSCHIKOFF the mine was sprung sooner than had been intended
by the Court of St. Petersburg.
"
xo
As ;,he French were already in control in this quarter and
as the action of Russia was not only against Turkey but also
distinctly hostile to trance, it is little wonder that the
French Ambassador, M. de Lavaletie, supported Lord Stratford
17. Fyffe, Mod . Europe , Vol. III., p. 191.
16. The Times , Jan. 8, 1855, p. 6,

11
at this time; nor is it all surprising that he is reported as
"the first to use threats." And while the ultimatum was in
the hands of the Sultan, M. de Lavalette's successor, M. de la
Cour, continued this policy by urging its rejection. And when
it was rejected there was nothing for Prince Menschikoff to do
hut to take his staff and depart from Constantinople.
The weakness and vacillation of the English Government
may have had some effect upon the actions of the Czar at this
critical time. Nicholas Land Lord Aberdeen, Prime Minister of
England, had been on quite intimate terms in their youthful days,
when in Paris in 1814; and this intimacy had been renewed in
901844, when the former visited the latter in London. Nicholas,
therefore, depended upon Aberdeen not to precipitate a difficulty
between their two governments because of the former's attempt
to coerce the Sultan. And, possibly, if Lord Stratford or Lord
Palmerston had bt.en in Aberdeen's place, the Czar would have
understood the situation better and would have refrained from
the war or would have entered it with a fuller realization of
its meaning. This weakness displayed by the Prime Minister,
Lord Aberdeen, in not making it clear what the policy of the
English Government would be, was also displayed by Lord Clarendon,
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in that he had "a went of firm-
ness and an undue reliance on the sincerity of tmperor Napoleon.
19. Dyer and Hassall, Mod . Europe , Vol. VI,, p. 118.
20. Fyffe, Mod , Europe , Vol . III.., p 182. Also Encyc . Brit. 11th
ed. Vol. XIX, p. 653-4.
21. Sid. Lee, Diet , of Nationa l Bios. , Vol. XX., p. 347-50.
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As it was, Czar Nicholas made the mistake of believing that
neither England nor France would alone fight him because of his
move against Turkey; and also, that an alliance of the two
22
against him was impossible."
Now that diplomatic relations were broken with Turkey, the
Czar proceeded to send troops into V.'allachia and Moldavia to
seize these provinces, not for permanent annexation but to be
held as a pledge, until Turkey would see fit to comply with the
demands he had sent Prince Menschikoff to deliver. In referring
to this act the Spectator quotes the Morning Post as saying,
"France and England consider this invasion as 'an act of war^"24
Then Nicholas issued a proclamation dated at Peterhoff, the 14th
(26th ) of June 1853 purporting to define his position. From
this proclamation may be quoted the following: "We do not seek
conquests; Russia does not need them. We demand satisfaction
for a legitimate right openly infringed. We are ready even now
to stop the movement of our troops, if the Ottoman Porte engages
to observe religiously the integrity of the privileges of the
Orthodox church. But if obstruction and blindness obstinately
desire the contrary, then invoking God to our aid, we will leave
to His care to decide our differences; and, placing our full
hope in His powerful hand, we will march to the defense of the
Orthodox faith."25
22. The Economist . Vol. XIV., (1856) Article on " True Optimism "
p. 589-90.
23. The Spectator
,
July 9, 1855, p. 651.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 651-2.

13
The break had occurred May 21, 1853, and the invasion and
his proclamation had, therefore, followed quickly. But added
to these steps the Czar had issued a "Manifesto w , which declared
the Orthodox church in Turkey in danger. His act was practically
equivalent to an appeal to all his subjects to engage in a
religious war against Turkey. Austria was now thoroughly alarmed
because these Principalities, which the Czar's troops had just
occupied, were on her frontier and were closely associated with
her own peopie. And yet for some reason, while England and
France were moving to check Russian advance, Austria abstained
from doing anything. In this attitude she was seconded by
Prussia, whose sovereign, Frederick William IV., was the Czar's
brother-in-law. The two countries v. ere so close to Russia and
had so much at stake that it seemed they could not take a bold
stand; and as the war progressed Austria's course proved to be
a tortuous one. As for Prussia, she maintained a steady course
but it was one of unbroken neutrality.
onferenc at Vienna .
Matters had progressed to such a point that it was evident
that, unless some strong, united effort were quickly made, war
would be inevitable. Accordingly, representatives of the four
Great Powers, Austria, France, England, and Prussia met at
Vienna, July 28, 1853, for the purpose of arriving at a satis-
factory solution. They believed it possible to draft .a treaty
acceptable to Russia that would still leave Turkey under less
26. The Spectator
,
Aug. 15, 1853, p. 773.
I
14
humiliating conditions than the forced acquiescence in Russia's
demands would provide. For this purpose they drafted a note
to which Russia agreed on condition that Turkey would accept it
unconditionally. But Turkey amended it to include a guarantee
by Russia that no interference would be made by the latter in
the future. Thus the matter ended and war was thenceforth in-
evitable. But there is one point of detail which must not be
neglected. It is at this point that the policy of Lord Strat-
ford is seen as most emphatically opposed to peace. For
diplomatically he advised Turkey to accept the note uncondition-
ally, but personally he gave the Sultan ample opportunity to
27know that he opposed such action. However, just how far we
can go in saying that England's representative was responsible
for the war, without stretching the statement beyond the realms
of truth is not quite apparent; but the indications are very
strong that he was responsible. Moreover, he is said to have
"boasted" that the war was his answer to the Czar's refusal to
accept him as an ambassador at St. Petersburg.
^
27. Cambridge Mod . Hist . Vol. XI., p. 314.
28. Miller, The Ottoman empire, p. 207.
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II. Events During the War until Arrangements
Were Made for the Congress.
While Russia and Turkey "ere the Only Belligerents .
It was now a matter of maintaining every possible diplomatic
advantage while at the same time gaining every possible military
advantage. Russia waited to let Turkey strike first, because
she wished to have the opportunity of declaring that she had
been attacked. There seems to have been a stronger disposition
on the part of Turkey to avoid striking first, for no move of
importance was made until October 4, more than three months after
the invasion of Moldavia by Russia. ^9 But having exhausted every
resource without accomplishing a withdrawal of troops or a
reconciliation, and feeling that England and France were strong-
ly supporting him, the Sultan sent an ultimatum to Russia demand-
ing the withdrawal of the troops from the Principalities within
15 days. This ultimatum Russia refused to heed and thereupon
Turkey declared war, October 23, 1853. Even now more than a
month passed with nothing accomplished except that Omar Pasha,
the Turkish commander, crossed the Danube and defeated the Russian
force at Oltenitza. This delay gave the Great Powers an oppor-
tunity to revert to their plan for a reconciliation; but
29. Skrine, Expansion of Russia
,
p. 152, gives this date October
8; Dyer and Hassall, Hist . of Mod . Europe , Vol. VI, p. 119,
says October 4; and Fyffe, Mod , rurope Vol. Ill* P. 196-7,
says October 10. But The Spectator , October 22, 1853, p.
1009, nays the following: "QJn the 4th of October, the
Mussulman New Year's Day, the manifesto of the Sultan con-
taining the declaration of war was read in all the mosques."

16
reconciliation was out of the question, now, for the reason that
Turkey was very sure of support.
This assurance on the part of Turkey was not confined to
secret advices given by Lord Stratford; for as early as the 13th
of June a combined English and French fleet had anchored at
Besika Bay and on October 22nd, just one day before the 15 days
of the Turkish ultimatum expired, this fleet pushed through the
Dardanelles and anchored in the Bosporus in disregard of the
"Convention of the Straits" of 1841. It is not strange, there-
fore, that the Sultan would refuse to consider reconciliation
when this fleet had broken a treaty on the simple plea that
disorders in Constantinople warranted the act; and especially
when the action had been taken just at the proper time to
strengthen the Sultan in his determination to make war.
But Russia was perfectly willing to assume responsibility,
too, as was shown November 30th, when Admiral Nachimoff sudden-
ly attacked Osman Pasha at Sinope during a fog and sunk his
whole fleet with the exception of one vessel. The Four Great
Powers acting at Vienna, apparently for the sake of appearances,
asked Turkey to state her conditions for terminating the war;
but Russia refused to accept Turkey's reply, because Russian
evacuation of the Principalities was demanded as the first move.
The Czar seemed disposed to accept the program prepared by
Turkey, if this part of it should be placed last after Turkey
had performed all of her own part of the program she had out-
lined. But just then there arrived at St. Petersburg, word
that the Anglo-French fleet had "invited" the Russian fleet to
t
17
return to Sebastopol. Thus the Czar saw that the diplomatic
intervention was not the only act indicative of the policy of
the Great Powers. In fact, it was quite clear that England
and Prance were more than likely to take part in the war. He
made no reply, therefore, to the note and early in February,
1854, diplomatic relations between St. Petersburg and the two
capitals of London and Paris were broken off.
Immediately, Nicholas endeavored to check England and
France by sending Count Orloff to visit Vienna and Berlin to
secure an agreement of neutrality on the part of Austria and
Prussia. But Austria was almost as nervous because of the
Russian invasion of the Principalities as Turkey herself; and
she refused to consider the proposition until a withdrawal should
be completed. Meanwhile England and France were drawing up an
ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops; but they
neglected to ask Austria and Prussia to unite with them in these
demands, although it is certain that Austria would have joined
them, had the opportunity been given. Instead, Napoleon, acting
for England and trance alone, wrote a letter to the Czar pro-
posing an armistice and the "mutual evacuation of Moldavia and
the Black Sea."30 To this the Czar replied indignantly that
the combined fleets had broken a treaty by entering the Dar-
danelles, and had done so without a declaration of war. Then
England and trance sent the ultimatum that should have included
Austria, if not Prussia, and the Czar ignored it. The action
50. Skrine, Expansion of nussia
,
p. 153.
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at Sinope is blamed for the Anglo-French haste in this matter,
because it inflamed the people to such an extent as to force
action by the Government. Nevertheless, it is quite evident
that, if they really desired to prevent a war, they should have
included Austria in the ultimatum. Many were the regrets later
that Austria was not in accord with them. As it was, a formal
declaration of war against Russia was made March 27, 1854, by
England and France.
The Extension of the v?ar to Other Countries
.
The little kingdom of Greece had for a few years been on
very unfriendly terms with Turkey, and now there seemed to be
a strong probability of war between them. Therefore France and
England sent a detachment to occupy the Piraeus and to demand a
guarantee from King Otho that he would maintain a strict neutral-
ity. UJ - This was done May 10, 1854, and the occupation, though
extremely offensive to King Otho and his Queen, was maintained
until long after the Crimean War was at an end. The withdrawal
actually took place no sooner than the latest date which the
terms of the treaty of Paris would permit.
The Turkish troops, encouraged by the knowledge of their
having both England and France as allies, and cheered by the
presence of a few active young Englishmen among them, pushed
such a vigorous campaign into the Principalities that the
51. Miller, The Ottoman Empire
, p. 225-4.
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Russians after two severe defeats began what soon proved to be
a complete withdrawal from the provinces. Nasmyth, one of
these young Englishmen, called the hero of Silistria, where the
Russians were thoroughly defeated, was a reporter for The Times .
And it is no wonder that "the closing events of the summer
campaign in Bulgaria did so much to kindle the zeal which forced
on the invasion of the Crimea and the statesmen and the
people in England, were touched, were stirred, nay were governed
by tne tidings which came from the Danube. "^2
Now that the Principalities had been evacuated, an oppor-
tunity was given for ending the war; and there was another
effort made by the tour Powers at Vienna to do this. But Eng-
land had not been in a war of any consequence for 40 years and
her people did not know the horrors of war. The glory of victory
predominated among all thoughts on the subject. Therefore, all
efforts for peace were weak and spiritless while those looking
to a vigorous prosecution of the war were strong and were hailed
with delight by the multitude. "England had become so eager for
conflict that the idea of desisting from the war merely because
the war had ceased to be necessary was not tolerable to the
1n3o
e
,
The Conference in Vienna.
The effort, just referred to, to end the war by diplomatic
means, began in April, 1854. At this time the representatives
52. Kinglake, Invasion of the Crimea , Vol. III., p. 51.
33. Ibid., p. 72.
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of the four1 Powers met in Vienna and agreed upon certain gen-
eral propositions, but nothing came of the effort. However,
a second attempt in August of the same year by three of these
Powers, England
>
Aiistria, and France outlined a particular plan
of action; and a "note detailing four points which they pro-
fessed themselves anxious to secure" was sent to Russia and
Turkey for their consideration. One can do no better than
to quote The Times on the provisions of this note. "The
memorandum of the 28th of December, 1854, which is prefixed to
the protocols of the subsequent Conferences at Vienna, states
in very plain and explicit terms the bases on which the negotia-
tion was opened, and the objects which the allied Powers have
undertaken to effect. It included the total abolition of the
Russo-Turkish treaties with reference to the Principalities, by
providing that none of the stipulations contained in them should
be revived at the peace; it stated that, in order to secure the
free navigation of the Lower Danube, the channel of the river
should be withdrawn from the territorial jurisdiction existing
by virtue of Article 3 of the Treaty of Adrianople; it proposed
to connect the Ottoman Empire more closely with the balance of
power in Europe, and to put an end to the preponderance of Russia
in the Black Sea; and, lastly, to cause Russia to renounce her
claim to an official protectorate of the Christian subjects of
the Sultan belonging to the Eastern church, and to surrender all
34. Cambridge Mod. Hist,. Vol. XI.,p. 321.
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the articles of former treaties on which that claim was founded.
These terms were framed by Prance end England, adopted in
the most formal manner by Austria, and accepted by Russia as
the basis of negotiation, °
In the meantime the Western Powers had pushed on from
Varna to Sebastopol and although they had failed to make any
great success of their campaign, they had succeeded in prevent-
ing the Russians from scoring a distinct success at Inkerman.
The result of this failure induced the Czar to reply favorably
to the note and to send Prince Gortschakoff with authority
to discuss the matter. In all probability the discussion would
have been without point and to no purpose had not Austria agreed,
December 2, 1854, as was already said, to intervene in case of
Russia's refusal.^ Early in January, 1855, therefore, the
acceptance by Russia, above mentioned, was received by the
Western Powers.
Distinct Effort for Peace .
Lord John Russell was appointed by the English Government
to represent his country at this conference, and while he was
yet on his way thither Czar Nicholas I . died; thus a great
impetus was given to the prospects for peace. The Times , of
March 5, 1855, in an editorial says, "No single event could
have happened in Europe of such momentous importance at the
present time to the whole family of nations, The
35. The Times
,
May 11, 1855, p. 9.
36. Ibid., Jan. 2, 1855, p. 6 and Jan. 9, 1855, p. 6.
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summons of BELSHAZZAR upon the fiery wall was not more appall-
ing, - the destruction of SENNACHERIB not more terrible." As
he had been held both by England and by France to be the
instigator of the war, and as his son and successor Alexander
II, was considered more pacific, it seemed that peace would
soon be arranged. But in this they were disappointed; for,
although the conference was opened March 15, 1855, the treaty
3.7
of peace ?;as not signed for more than a year.
Lord John Russell has already been mentioned as England's
plenipotentiary at this conference. The French sent M.Drouyn
de Lhuys, their Minister of Foreign Affairs. Likewise Turkey
sent Aali Pasha, who held a similar position in his Government;
and Russia, Count Orloff, a diplomat of equal or higher stand-
ing. These men met at Vienna the plenipotentiary of Austria-
Hungary, Count Buol, who had. been the agent in bringing about
z pthe conference. Their work proceeded smoothly until they
reached the third point, which referred to the termination of
the Russian domination of the Black Sea. 39 This point became
the source of endless discussion and threatened to break up
the conference altogether. 40 But, as these "four points" had
been accepted by Russia as the basis of negotiation, the Western
Powers felt that Russian sincerity was brought into question
37. The_ Times , Jan. 20, 1855, p. 9.
38. Ibid., April 2, 1855, p. 6
39. Ibid., May 11, 1855, p. 9.
40. Ibid., March 30, 1855, p. 8.
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by Prince Gortschakof
f
1
s refusal to accept their interpreta-
tion of the third point. Prince Gortschakoff, on the other
hand, felt that the question of interpretation was at least
partly in his hands. He believed the third point could be
arranged satisfactorily, but not in the way the Western Powers
were outlining it.
Finally, Count Buol prepared a plan by which Russia was
not to be prohibited from the Black Sea, but was to be limited
to the same number of ships, and these of the same specified
character, as were to be permitted to Turkey there. His plan
provided for the maintenance of a few small war vessels there
by England and France, too, His project became known as the
"System of Counterpoise." 41 Moreover, he succeeded in persuad-
ing both M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord John Russell that this plan
was a good, safe, and reasonable proposition. But, as it
was beyond the full powers granted them, it would be necessary
to return for further instructions. Count Buol persuaded
them to return to their respective capitals and secure the
adoption of this change in policy on the third point, by promis-
ing to enter a triple alliance with England and France. This
alliance had been sought by the Western Powers and the oppor-
tunity to secure it seemed good to these two plenipotentiaries,
who proceeded to agree to a recess in their efforts at Vienna
while they should visit Paris and London. But they were doomed
to disappointment, as both Governments denounced the plan and
41. The Times, July 14, 1855, p. 8.
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refused to make any such changes. ^ M. Drouyn de Lhuys re-
signed within two days; but Lord Russell, when he found the
proposition so objectionable, tried to cover up his real posi-
tion in the matter, and did not resign until months later at
a time when it was really humiliating. There had been frequent
correspondence both by mail and by telegraph between the home
Governments and the diplomats at Vienna and it seems a little
strange that so great a misunderstanding should have occurred.^
42. An extract from the letter of the Earl of Clarendon, dated
April 3, 1855, to Lord John Russell, as given in The Times
of July 14, 1855, p. 9. - "A reciprocal engagement between
Russia and Turkey to maintain an equal number of ships in
the Black Sea would secure the preponderance of Russia,
whose ships would always be better manned, better armed,
and in a better condition than those of Turkey, but Count
Bug! proposed that at the same time other Powers should
maintain a limited number of ships of war in the Black Sea,
for the special object of keeping clear the navigation of
the Danube, and upon that I begged to observe that the special
object might or might not be the real one, and Count Buol
might be sure that England and France would not profess
one thing while they intended another, But if
England and France, under pretext of watching the Danube,
were to send a force into the Black Sea to protect Turkey
and keep Russia in check, then we should simply be continuing
the present system, which effectually secures both these
objects, but which system we are on every account desirous
to put an end to."
43. From another letter published in The Times of July 14, 1855
and dated the same day as the former letter from which an
extract is given; April 3, 1855; and also from the Earl of
Clarendon to Lord John Russell:
It was then agreed :-
1. That the two systems, namely, that of the neutrali-
zation of the Black Sea, and that of the limitation of
the naval forces of Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea, should
be explained to Austria, and that she should be asked whether
she would adopt either the one or the other, so as to
cooperate with France and England in proposing it to Russia,
undertaking further to co-operate in war with France and Eng-
land if the plan so proposed should be rejected by Russia.
2. That it should be understood that France and Eng-
land would prefer the system of neutralization if Austria,
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Thus the Vienna Conference which had begun with such promise of
an early peace ended on June 4, 1885, without having accomplish
ed any thing except discredit for England's plenipotentiary
and disappointment for the Austrian Government to the extent
that she terminated her treaty of December 2d with the Western
Powers, and declared her intention of maintaining a strict
neutrality. ^ By this act she not only gave herself a strong
43 (con't) should leave the choice to England and France.
3. That if Austria should refuse to bind herself to
co-operate in war with France and Ens-land, in the event
of Russia rejecting that one of the two proposals which
Austria might concur with France and England in propos-
ing, then France and England should propose the plan
of neutralization, and if it be rejected by Russia the
negotiation must be broken off."
Also this extract from a letter by Lord John Russell
to the Earl of Clarendon, dated April 10, 1855 at Vienna
and published by the Times July 14, 1855, p. 9.
"Before Count Buol could answer, I requested his
attention to what I conceived to be the position of Austria.
From the first moment of Prince Menschikof
f
1
s leaving Con-
stantinople I had thought that, with the assistance of
Austria, we might easily defeat the designs of Russia in
the East; that without Austria, we should have a long though
doubtless a victorious contest I showed that the
project of counterpoise was ineffectual, as we could not
always have a large fleet at hand; humiliating to Turkey,
if she were to always lean on France and England; unsafe
for Europe, which would be kept in the perpetual ferment
of preparation for war W e were, however, ready to
adopt the plan of limitation if Austria on its rejection,
would join us in the war." Thus it will be seen the
chief purpose of I- ranee and England was to force Austria
into the war. Lord Russell failing to secure Buol's
acceptance of any of these plans, wrote concerning Buol's
plan, "In relating what passed at the meeting I have omitted
to say that Count Buol, in the paper which he read to us,
declared that if Russia were to refuse to guarantee the
integrity of Turkey it would be a casus belli with Austria,
this from another letter dated April 12, at Vienna, by Lord
imssell to the harl of Clarendon. From this and many other
letters published in the Times it will be seen that the two
plenipotentiaries had good reason to believe they would
succeed by going home to explain, and indeed the final draft
44. Ibid., July 14, 1855, p. 8.
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impulse in the direction of decline, but she opened the way for
Sardinia to begin her ascendancy.
Sardinia T s 2ntrance into the onflict .
The position of Austria had now become peculiarly difficult.
In her efforts to maintain proper relations with all the belli-
45gerents and yet remain at peace she found many perplexing problems.
But one cause of her devious course and of her many instances of
vacillation was the position taken by M. Cavour, the very able
statesman and Premier of the little State of Sardinia. Russia had
never recognized Sardinia nor had she entered into any form of
diplomatic relations with her, but no one, not even the King of
Sardinia nor M. Cavour, wished to make this a pretext for war
against Russia.^ But for confirming the friendship of France and
England so as to secure a participation in the congress at the close
of hostilities in a distinct effort to supplant Austria in Italian
affairs, M. Cavour thrust his little country into the war on
the side of the Western Powers. The 15,000 troops thus placed
at the disposal of the allies gave good account of themselves.
at the Tchernaya and other places of conflict, winning for
Sardinia the coveted place in the congress at the close of the
47
war, And this participation of M. Cavour in the Congress
had very much to do not only with the acts of the congress but
43.(con't). of the treaty was in this particular little differ-
ent from Count Buol's plan.
45. Ibid., July 17, 1855, p. 9. Quotation from Independence Beige. •
46. Ibid., April 14, 1856, p. 10.
47. Ibid., August 18, 1855, p. 9.
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also with the course of events at its close.
The cause of the earnestness of Cavour in this matter
was the state of the internal aflairs of the Italian peoples.
There had been no unity for them since the invasion of the
Lombards in 568 A.D. And for most people there seemed to be
little prospect for Italian unity in the future. But Cavour
felt that, if Austria could be made to retire from the
northern portions, trance might be persuaded to retire from
the center; and thus an opportunity would be given for the
much hoped for and long desired unification of Italy.
There were many features that affected the belligerents
which may be referred to as contingencies; of which it would
be well to relate a few as side lights on the situation. There
was quite a little jealousy shown one for another among the
allies; especially was this true of England for France. The
English people wanted war but were not prepared for it; and,
therefore, blundered very grievously.^® The French people were
apathetic; their Emperor it was that wanted war. But the
French gave a better account of themselves in the actions in
the Crimea, especially toward the close of the campaign; end
this caused an increase of that jealousy which threatened
several times to make serious trouble. On the other hand there
were distinct attempts to weld the alliance more firmly, as is
shown by the fact that the Sovereigns of three of the allies
visited at the homes of the others. First the Emperor Napoleon
III. and Empress Euge'nie visited London and were received with
48. Ibid. , Jan. 3, 1855 . p . 6
.
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great enthusiasm and applause. Then Queen Victoria and
Prince Albert visited Paris and rode down the Champs Elysees
in great splendor, receiving the plaudits of the nation. 50 And
finally, King Victor Emmanuel II. of Sardinia visited both
51Paris and London, making friends on every side.
But after these visits were all over and the war was con-
tinuing without apparent hope of an early settlement, the news-
papers of the various capitals became engaged in a species of
sparring that did not assist in strengthening the good feeling
among the allies; and this practice continued, and even in-
creased, as the settlement of the war became a daily expectancy
The fall of Sebastopol after a year of siege on September
9, 1855, satisfied the French, who were now ready to make peace
and had England's part in this victory been more satisfactory
to her, she would have been as ready to declare Russia suffi-
ciently humbled. As it was, England manifested a dispostion
to continue the punishment of Russia. And Sardinia was dis-
49. Ibid., April 17, 1855, p. 8.
50. Ibid., Aug. 20, 1855, p. 6.
51. Ibid., Nov. 24, 1855, p. 6 and Bee. 3, 1855, p. 7.
52. To illustrate one may well take an excerpt from the
criticism of the Paris correspondent for The Times
published first in the Paris Moniteur and copied in
The Times , March 26, 1856:
"In its number of the 22nd of March, The Times
on the faith of its Paris correspondent, represents
our army in the Crimea as wanting in everything in
provisions and clothes, and as if abandoned by the
Government of the Emperor, who is said to take no
more care whatever, for those brave troops. The
Times goes so far as to say that our soldiers are
reduced to go and pick up the waste biscuit and re-
fuse food thrown away by the English soldiers."
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appointed in that the end was coming too soon for her to secure
what she wanted. In the meantime Austria, realizing that her
position was becoming less and less influential, determined to
find some form of ultimatum, that would satisfy France, for
sending to Russia. This she did because she wished to be the
party concerned in the bringing of the war to a close, and be-
cause she felt the need of friendly relations with France. Behind
such reasons, her real purpose was to supplant Sardinia in the
affections of France. She proceeded therefore to draft an ulti-
matum embodying the essentials of the "four points", and then
went to Napoleon III. in person for advice. When finally, Eng-
land was given an opportunity to pass upon the ultimatum, the
feeling that was already rising was heightened somewhat by the
knowledge that the matter had been kept from her. However, after
she had protested that a fifth point in regard to the prohibition
of fortifications on the Aland Islands should be added, and after
an explanation was made to her that a certain general clause would
cover the point in question, she acquiesced rather peevishly.
Then the ultimatum was sent to St. Petersburg, its delivery being
entrusted to Count Valentine Esterhazy.
53. A letter from The Times correspondent published December
13, 1855, and touching upon this subject of distrust for
one another among the allies is not inappropriate:
"PARIS, TUESDAY, DEC. 18, 6 P. M.
The propositions which Count Valentine Esterhazy is carry-
ing to St. Petersburg are completely adopted by the three
Powers - France, England, and Austria. I have already
informed you that whatever difference existed between the
two former has disappeared, and however we may doubt as to
the conduct of Austria in the event of their rejection
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Some of the sparring referred to above pertained to the
conditions of the troops in the Crimea and elsewhere. And it
is very plain from all that was said on both sides that the
conditions for months at a time among the English soldiers were
extremely bad. There were two reasons given for this. In the
first place the medical and commissary departments singularly
failed to do their duty. And secondly, the weather was any-
thing but propitious, so that partly as a result of these two
causes there broke out an extremely malignant form of cholera
among the troops.^ The hospitals were overcrowded and many
thousands died almost without having seen the enemy. That the
French soldiers fared much better than the English is not to
be believed and the evidence is sufficient to prove only that
their conditions were probably a little better. 55 As for
Turkey, her finances had had to be propped up; but otherwise
she stood the test better, proportionately, than her allies.
And her part in the conflict had been carried out with credit
to herself, notwithstanding the popular apprehension in England
at the beginning of the struggle.
But Russia had had difficulties, too. The Russian army
had been very successful, considering the odds against which
it was forced to operate. The distances were great, the roads
impassable, the weather often extremely bad, the ravages
53. ( con't) by Russia, it is certain that for the present she
is with us, and that she thinks the conditions are such
as Russia ought to accept."
54. The Times , March 26, 1856, p. 6.
55. Ibid., January 11, 1855, p. 6.
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of cholera and typhus frightful, 5 ^ and the number and strength
of the enemy decidedly more than the Czar had anticipated. 5'
Yet through the efforts of their capable military engineer,
Todleben, they held their own for a surprisingly long time; and
when, because of financial troubles besides those already named,
they finally did agree to make peace on terms named by the
allies, they were, even then, able to obtain by means of
diplomacy, as will be more fully explained later, much that had
seemed lost.
Arrangements for the Congress
.
Count Valentine ^sterhazy arrived in St. Petersburg
on Wednesday, December 26, 1855, and communicated the conditions
of peace to the St. Petersburg Cabinet on the following day. 58
And on the 28th, Count Buol in Vienna explained to Prince
Gortschakoff , the Russian Ambassador, the terms of the ultima-
S0
turn. They are substantially as follows:
(1) The Protectorate over the Principalities must be termi-
nated and a rectification of the frontier between Russia and
Turkey arranged.
(2) Freedom of the Danube must be guaranteed to all the
Powers and the right to maintain a few vessels there to protect
these interests must be admitted.
56. Ibid., March 17, 1856, p. 10.
57. The economist . Vol. 14, (1856) p. 389-390.
58. The 'Times
,
January 4, 1856, p. 7.
59. Ibid., January 11, 1856, p. 7.
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(3) The Black Sea must be neutralized and thrown open to
the merchant vessels of all nations but closed to the war
vessels of all nations.
(4) Christian subjects of the Porte must be assured their
religious and political rights, - Austria, France, Great Britain,
and the Porte now agree and Russia must agree, also.
(5) "The belligerent Powers reserve to themselves the right
which appertains to them of producing in a European interest
special conditions over and above the four guarantees."
On January 18, 1856, The Times published this despatch
from the French Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs at Paris:
"Count Esterhazy writes today from St. Petersburg that M.
de Nesselrode has just notified to him the unconditional
acceptance ( l?aeceptation pure et simple ) of the propositions
contained in the ultimatum
,
which propositions are to serve as
preliminaries of peace.
60. An extract from a letter of the correspondent of The Times:
"VIENNA, Jan. 26. (1856) As you have already been
informed, a kind of protocol of what had occurred was
drawn up at St. Petersburg, and signed or 'paraphed'* by
Count Nesselrode for Russia, and Count Valentine Esterhazy
for Austria. A copy of the document arrived here on the
24th, and other copies of it were on the same day forwarded
to Paris, and, as I believe, to London. The hussian
Government has also expressed certain wishes in respect to
the future preliminaries of peace, and one of them cannot
fail to wound the pride of this Cabinet. Russia desires -
1st, that the preliminaries of peace be paraphed in
this city by the representatives of the four Powers, and,
2dly, that they - the preliminaries - be signed in
the capital of France. It is not clear why Count Nesselrode
should desire to have the preliminaries paraphed here; but
it is evident that when he expressed a wish that they should
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At the same time The Times published a message from its
own correspondent in Berlin, which represented the Czar as
being influenced considerably by the representations of the
Government of Prussia.
Since Austria's actions had been anything but pleasing to
Russia, and at the same time had been very disappointing to
both England and France, Russia had little difficulty in lo-
cating the Congress in Paris instead of in Vienna. Moreover,
Russia expressed a strong desire to have the unpleasantness
62
ended and a peace concluded "as speedily as possible." Accord-
ingly, all the belligerents and Austria proceeded to appoint
plenipotentiaries, two each, who were to meet at Paris as soon
as convenient. A protocol^ was paraphed, February 1, 1856,
at Vienna by Isam Bey of Turkey, Count Buol of Austria, Sir
Hamilton Seymour of England, Baron de Bourqueney of France,
60. (con't) be signed in Paris he intended to kill two birds
with one stone - to cajole the belligerent France, and
to slight the mediator, Austria, "
"-«-The meaning of the diplomatic expression 'paraphed'
is, that the initials of the parties concerned are attached
to a document."
61. The Times, January 18, 1856, p. 6.
62. Ibid., January 28, 1856, p. 7.
65. Ibid., February 7, 1856, p. 8.
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and Prince Gortschakof f of Russia.^ They made five copies
or "expeditions" of the protocol, one for each of the respectiv<
Governments concerned. Then "Prince Gortschakoff requested
that Prussia should he invited to take part in the conferences,
Count Buol supported the request. The French and English
Ministers took notice of it, ad referendum," and the movement
64. Ibid., February 6, 1856, p. 10. - From the regular corres-
pondent at Vienna, dated February 1. "The French and
British Ministers yesterday received instructions to sign
the so-often mentioned protocol. Immediately after the
receipt of their despatches Sir. H. Seymour and M. de
Bourqueney communicated their contents to the Austrian
Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the Turkish Embassy.
In the course of the evening it was settled that the
representatives of England, France, Turkey, and Russia
should meet at the Foreign Office at 12 today, and then and
there sign the important document in question. At the
appointed hour the four foreign diplomats had assembled,
and they and Count Buol attached their signatures to the
subjoined protocol :-
"Par suite de 1 'acceptation par leurs Cours respectives
des cinq propositions renferme'es dans le document ci-annexe',
sous le titre de 'Projet des Preliminaires , ' les soussigne's,
apre's 1 'avoir psraphe, conformment a 1 ''autorisation
quails ont re^us A cet effet, sont convenus que leurs
Gouvernments nommeront chacun des Ple'nipotentiaires, qui,
munis des pleins pouvoirs ne'cessaires pour proce'der a* la
signature des pre'liminaires de paix formels, conclue'ront
un armistice et un trait a' depaix de'finitif . Les dits
Plenipotentiaires auront a" se reunir a Paris dans le terme
de trois semaines a partir de ce jour, ou plutot si faire
se peut.
Fait a Vienne ce lerFevrier."
(les Cinq. Signatures)
(Translation of the foregoing)
"In consequence of the acceptance by their respective
Courts of the five propositions contained in the document
hereunto annexed, under the title of 'Draft of Preliminaries',
the undersigned, after having paraphed it, conformably to
authorization received to that effect, have agreed that
their Governments shall each nominate Plenipotentiaries,
who, furnished with full powers necessary for proceeding
to the signature of formal preliminaries of peace, shall
c6nclude an armistice and a definitive treaty of peace.
The said Plenipotentiaries will have to assemble at Paris
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was fairly inaugurated.^ France, apparently, would have been
willing that Prussia be admitted to participate, but England
continued to object; so that not until the work of the Congress
was practically ended did Prussia succeed in securing places
among the plenipotentiaries . ^6
But little Sardinia, though unrepresented in the ultimatum
sent to St. Petersburg, disappointed because peace was coming
before she had been able to see her desires realized, and over-
looked in the signing of the protocol at Vienna, was, neverthe-
less, invited to participate in the Congress, because she had
participated in the war. Thus the number of plenipotentiaries
was from the first twelve, and so remained until, when it became
apparent that a revision of renewal of the Treaty of the 13th
of July. 1841, to which Prussia was a signatory, was necessary,
• 67
England withdrew her objections to Prussia s sending two more.
64. (con't). within the term of three weeks dating from this,
or sooner if it can be done.
Done at Vienna, this 1st day of February, 1856"
(The Five Signatures)
65. Ibid., February 5, 1856, p. 8. Quoted from the Nord of Vienna.
66. Ibid., January 31, 1856, p. 9 " " Borsen Zeitung .
67. Ibid., March 15, 1856, p. 10. " '* " Moniteur
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CHAPTER II. THE CONGRESS.
I. Personnel of the Congress
The protocol having been paraphed at Vienna and a time limit
of three weeks having been set for the meeting of the pleni-
potentiaries in Paris, it became necessary that the Governments
concerned should choose representatives and send them on their
missions without further delay. It seems best in speaking of
these men to take them in order and deal with each somewhat in
detail, so as to give some familiarity with the personnel of the
Congress to be considered.
His Majesty, the Emperor of the French, appointed the Sieur
Alexander Count Colonna 'Aalewski, a Senator of the Empire, Grand
Officer of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honor, Knight
Grand Cross of the Equestrian Order of the Seraphim, Grand Cross
of the Order of St. Maurice and St . Lazarus, decorated with the
Imperial Order of the Medjidie, of the First Class, his Minister
and Secretary of State for foreign Affairs, as his leading man
for this important business. And for the second man he appointed
the Sieur Francis Adolphus, Baron de Bourqueney, Grand Cross of
the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honor and of the Order of
Leopold of Austria, decorated with the portrait of the Sultan in
diamonds, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
to His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty. 1 The former was,
therefore, already in Paris and the latter was under the necessity
of leaving Vienna for Paris as soon as possible. Count Walewskij
1. The Times
,
April 29, 1856, p. 12.
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who was the son of Napoleon I. and his mistress Marie, Countess
Walewska, was recognized as a very able man, and as time and
necessity forced ability to the front he gave a very good account
of himself, as will be evident as we proceed. The Baron de
Bourqueney, however, having been the ambassador to Austria-Hungary
and feeling the necessity of showing some friendship for the
country to which he was accredited, became too subservient to
Count Buol; and therefore shared the latter' s unpopularity which
was probably not fully deserved.
^
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland was represented by the Right Honorable George William
Frederick, Earl of Clarendon, Baron Hide of Hindon, a Peer of
the United Kingdom, a member of Her Britannic Majesty's Most
Honorable Privy Council, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the
Garter, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honorable Order of the
Bath, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State; and the Right
Honorable Henry Richard Charles, Baron Cowley, a Peer of the
United Kingdom, a member of Her Majesty's Most Honorable Privy
Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honorable Order of the
Bath, Her Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
to His Majesty the Emperor of the French.^ The former has al-
ready been referred to a number of times, and it will be remember-
ed that he had early made the intimate acquaintance of Nicholas I.
who relied upon him to hold England back from interference in
2. Ibid., April 19, 1856, p. 10. From the letter of the Paris
correspondent
.
3. Ibid., April 29, 1856, p. 12.
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the "Eastern Question." That he was a man of good intentions
and of moderate ability, but lacking in the elements necessary
to give Europe full knowledge of England's policy in a crisis,
seems to be the generally accepted verdict in regard to Lord
Clarendon. The latter was already in Paris, since, as has been
said, he was at the time acting as Ambassador for the Queen. He
was a younger man than Lord Clarendon and therefore took a sec-
ondary position in the Congress, yet he with Baron Bourqueney
was a member of the sub- committee appointed to draft the treaty
when the time came for that important duty. 4
His Majesty Alexander II., the Emperor of All the Russias,
appointed as his representatives, the Sieur Alexis, Count Orloff,
his Aide-de-Camp General and General of Cavalry, Commander of
Headquarters of His Majesty, a Member of the Council of the Empire
and of the Committee of Ministers, decorated with two portraits
in diamonds of their Majesties the late Emperor Nicholas and the
Emperor Alexander II., Knight of the Order of St. Andrew, in
4. From The Times , March 19, 1856, p. 6, is obtained the follow-
ing information: The sub- committee appointed to make a draft
of the treaty included the following men: Lord Cowley, Baron
Bourqueney, Count Buol, Count Cavour, Aali Pasha, and Baron
Brunow. The correspondent gives this list without comment.
Just why these members were chosen for this important work
is not clear. That the choice included one representative
from each country is evident. And that three of the countries
had their abler representative in the list is a suggestion
that the choice was for the purpose of securing skill, legality,
and despatch together with harmony; and at the same time to
leave England, France, and Russia each her abler member to use
the recess in contemplation of the whole situation with the
opportunity of taking the work of the sub-committee into review
when it should be completed.
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diamonds, and of the Orders of Russia, Grand Cross of the Order
of St. Stephen of Austria of the First Class of the Black Eagle
of Prussia, in diamonds, and of several other foreign orders) and
the Sieur Philip, Baron de Brunow, his Privy Councilor, his Envoy
Extraordinary and minister Plenipotentiary to the Germanic Confed-
eration and to the Grand Duke of Hesse, Knight of the Order of
St. Wladimir of the First Class, of St. Alexander Newski enriched
with diamonds, of the White Eagle, of St. Anne of the First Class,
of St. Stanislaus of the First Class, Grand Cross of the Order of
the Red Eagle of Prussia of the First Class, Commander of the Order
of St. Stephen of Austria, and of several other foreign orders.^
The former has been mentioned in connection with the effort of the
Czar to have Austria and Prussia maintain neutrality. He was a
men well fitted for the task assigned him and it mey be truly said
that he did more for his country in the Congress than even Todleben,
the only hero of the war, did in the armies of the Czar. The
latter es was mentioned above, was an ambassador to the Germanic
Confederation, and was therefore a man fitted by experience to
be an assistant of his chief, the able Count Orloff . Baron Brunow
was also honored with membership in the sub-committee which draft-
ed the treaty at the close of their deliberations.
The Emperor of Austria, Francis Joseph II., appointed the
Sieur Charles Ferdinand, Count of Buol-Schauenstein, Grand Cross
of the Imperial Order of Leopold of Austria, and Knight of the
Order of the Iron Crown of the First Class, Grand Cross of the
5. Ibid., April 29, 1856, p. 12.
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Imperial Order of the Legion of Honor, Knight of the Orders of
the Black nagle and of the Red Eagle of Prussia, Grand Cross
of the Imperial Orders of Alexander Newski, in diamonds, and of
the Vvhite Eagle of Russia, Grand Cross of the Order of St. John
of Jerusalem, decorated with the Imperial Order of the Medjidie
of the First Class, his Chamberlain and actual Privy Councillor,
his Minister of the House of Foreign Affairs, President of the
Conference of Ministers; and Sieur Joseph Alexander Baron de
Hubner, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Iron Crown,
Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honor, his
actual Privy Councillor, and his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary to the Court of France. The former has been
mentioned very often in the report of the diplomatic acts which
finally led to the holding of the Congress in question. Until
the beginning of the actual sessions of the Congress Count Buol
seemed to be a large factor in the situation, but soon after
this it became apparent that he was not in control; and, as we
shall see, his influence continued to decline. The latter
appears at no time to have had a prominent place in the Congress
and this was probably permitted to continue partly on account
of his being second to Count Buol whose star seemed to be setting, I
His Majesty, the Emperor of the Ottomans, chose as his re-
presentatives Muhammed Emin Aali Pasha, Grand Vizier of the
Ottoman Empire, decorated with the Imperial Orders of the Medjidie
of the Merit of the First Class, Grand Cross of the Imperial
Order of the Legion of Honor, of St. Stephen of Austria, of the
Red Eagle of Prussia, of St. Anne of Russia, of St. Maurice and

St. Lazarus of Sardinia, of the Polar Star of Sweden, and of
several other foreign orders; and Mehemmed Djemil Bey, decorated
with the Imperial Order of the Medjidie of the Second Class, and
Grand Cross of the Order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus, his
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the
rmperor of the French, accredited in the same character to His
Majesty the King of Sardinia. The former was concerned in several
conferences held at Constantinople within the period covered by
the above described conferences, at Vienna.* His ability was
much above the average of the membership of the Congress, and
he went to Paris with ready plans to gain as much, even more,
than could have been expected of a representative from so decadent
a country as his. His colleague was already in Paris and as
Ambassador both to the French and to the Piedmontese he was nat-
urally in a position to assist the movement in favor of Italy
as opposed to Austria.
The King of Sardinia, Victor Emmanuel II., chose as his
plenipotentiaries, the Sieur Camille Benso, Count of Cavour,
Grand Cross of the Order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus, Knight
of the Order of Civil Merit of Savoy, Grand Cross of the Imperial
Order of the Legion of Honor, decorated with the Imperial Order
of the Medjidie' of the First Class, Grand Cross of several other
foreign orders, President of the Council of Ministers, and his
Minister Secretary of State for the Finances; and the Sieur
Salvator, Marquis de Villamarina, Grand Cross of the Order of
See above page 22.

St. Maurice and St. Lazarus, Grand Officer of the Imperial Order
of the Legion of Honor, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary to the Court of France. The former, Count
Cavour, was no doubt the ablest diplomat of the Congress. He
had partly given proof of this fact by the method he took to in-
sure Sardinia's participation in the great event. It is usual
that the greatest successes are scored by a nation only when
military efficiency is well supported by diplomatic ability; and
in this instance is a singular illustration of that fact. He
was seconded by the Sardinian Ambassador to France whose position
and associations were favorable to a closer alliance with France
and England; and, therefore, to the consummation of the isolation
of Austria which Cavour hoped to bring about.
When the Congress had almost finished its work and it had
become evident that the convention of the 13th of July, 1841, would
certainly become a factor in the negotiations, an invitation to
His Majesty the King of Prussia to send representatives brought
the following personages from the Prussian Court: the Sieur
Otho Theodore Baron de Manteuffel, President of His Majesty's
Council, and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Knight of the Red
Eagle of Prussia of the First Class, with Oak-leaves, Crown, and
Sceptre, Grand Commander of the Order of Hohenzollern, Knight
of the Order of St. John of Prussia, Grand Cross of the Order of
St. Stephen of Hungary, Knight of the Order of St. Alexander
Newski, Grand Cross of the Order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus,
and of the Order of the Nichau-Iftihar of Turkey; and the Sieur
Maximilian Frederick Charles Francis, Count of Hatzfeldt Wilden-
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burg Schoenstein, his actual privy Councillor, his Envoy Extra-
ordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of France,
Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle of Prussia of the Second
Class, with Oak-leaves and Badge, Knight of the Cross of Honor
of Hohenzollern of the First Class. Thus it will be seen that
Prussia sent the head of her Department of State and her chief
representative at the Court of France. In making these selec-
tions Prussia was simply following the precedent set by the other
States concerned; for four of them, England, Austria, Turkey,
and Sardinia, had already selected, as a second representative,
the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to France,
while all of them had chosen the head of the Department of State
as the first representative. The selections indicated clearly
that the countries concerned considered the questions to be
settled as of prime importance - as questions that demanded the
careful attention of the ablest men and the highest officials of
Europe. Herein lies the reason for designating their work as
that of a Congress; although it may be well to note that with the
exception of Cavour, the highest officials of that time were not
men of conspicuous ability and that no Sovereign was himself a
member
.
But while no Sovereign was a member, yet Napoleon III. had
great influence, for several reasons which are quite obvious. In
the first place his army by comparison had been successful in
the war, and he had become quite popular for that and other
reasons to be discussed later. In the second place, Russia's
choice of Paris as a place for retiring from the conflict gave
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France and her Sovereign precedence over all others. b Again,
his presence in the city where the sessions were held had the
effect usually felt in such cases. And finally, probably as
an outgrowth of the last reason, five of the fourteen members
of the Congress were resident Ministers at Paris; so that, includ-
ing the two furnished by France, one half the membership belonged
in France, and were accustomed to French influence.
6. An editorial in The Times of March 27, 1856, has an interest-
ing comment on this subject, from which the following excerpt
is taken.
No one can doubt that the reputation of the French
EMPEROR and people has been much exalted by the present war.
It requires but a small acquaintance with European opinion
to recognize that France has, by the wisdom of her policy
and the energy of her action, taken a higher place in the
commonwealth of nations, and dispersed those doubts which
had been generated by the commotions of 1848 and the follow-
ing years. In the Crimea her armies have added new vic-
tories to the roll on which Austerlitz and Friedland are
inscribed, and now a peace is about to be concluded in the
French capital which ?/ill associate that city once more with
the great landmarks of European history.
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II. History of the Congress
The Arrival and eception of the Plenipotentiaries .
As the seven members who were not at home in Paris began to
arrive, considerable interest was given to the question of their
choice of lodgings. The Paris correspondent of The Times on
Sunday, February 10th, reported that Lord Clarendon's quarters
would be "at the Hotel Bristol" and that Count Buol would "lodge
at the Hotel de la Terrasse, in the Rue de Rivoli, near the Place
de la Concorde." But on Wednesday following he reported that
Count Buol would probably not be able to secure his apartments
at the Hotel de la Terrasse, as the party occupying it declined,
to give it up. By Saturday, February 16th, the report was that
both Lord Clarendon and Count Buol had arrived and that the for-
mer's quarters were "at the Hotel de Louvre", while the latter
was "lodged at the Hotel Bristol, Place Vendome." The correspon-
dent made no reference to the change made by Lord Clarendon. Both
Count Orloff and Baron Brunow from Russia "took up their quarters
7
at the Hotel of the Russian Embassy", probably because they
felt that it would be well to remain aloof from the influence
of the city and of the other diplomats. If this were their
reason, they were soon aware of the futility of such an endeavor;
' for Baron Brunow was unable to meet Count Orloff at the railway
station on the latter 's arrival on account of being invited
to a concert given at the Tuileries by the Emperor. 8 The
correspondent of The Times neglected to refer to the lodgings
of Count Cavour and of Aali Pasha, but he mentions the arrival
7. Ibid., February 12, 1856, p. 8.
8. Ibid., February 25, 1856, p. 9.
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of each and their audiences with the Emperor, such as were given
to each of the Plenipotentiaries.
Although the agreement made in Vienna February first re-
quired the assembling of the Plenipotentiaries within three weeks,
an actual meeting including an organization for work did not
occur until Monday February 25th. On that day the twelve men
came together at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and remained in
I
Q
session until half past 4 o'clock. Count 7,'alewski, being the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sovereign in whose capital
the Congress was held, was asked to preside. 1^ A very handsome
table was fitted up for their use. It was covered with rich
crimson velvet and surrounded by chairs highly suitable for such
an occasion. They chose to seat themselves at this table in
alphabetical order by countries. Count Walewski sat at the head
of the table and his colleague, Baron Bourqueney at the foot. 11
Then They arranged themselves according to the following diagram:
Count Walewski
Count Buol
Lord Clarendon
(Baron Manteuffel)
Count Orloff
Count Cavour
Aali Pasha
Baron de Hubner
Lord Cowley
(Count Hatzfeldt)
Baron Brunow
Marquis de Villa
Marina
Mehemmed Djemil Bey
Baron Bourqueney
9. Ibid., February 27, 1856, p. 9. Quoted from The lvloniteur .
10. Ibid., February 15, 1856, p. 8.
11. Ibid., February 21, p. 10.
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It will be remembered that the two Plenipotentiaries of
Prussia, bracketed in the above diagram, were not present until
just at the close of the sessions. Their places at the table
would naturally be between the representatives of England and
Russia; but, as the table was made for only 12, some provision
for lengthening it must have been made. 12
At the first session an armistice was signed which was to
take effect immediately, that is on February 25, and was to last
until March 31; but it was "to have no effect on the blockades
now established, or that may be established. 1,15 According to
the Vienna correspondent of The Times
, at this first meeting
Count Buol "made the discovery that the atmosphere of the French
capital" was "less favourable to Russia than that of Vienna, and
to have found the French Government somewhat less inclined to
make peace at any price than he had expected to find it." 1^ When
they adjourned for the day they went to a banquet given by Count
Walewski, at which all the Ministers, Senators, Deputies, and
15high dignitaries of the Crown were in attendance. But this
was neither the first nor the last of its kind which the Pleni-
potentiaries were expected to attend. The Emperor had called a
council of Ministers at the Tuileries five days earlier, and
most of the Plenipotentiaries had been present and had attended
the banquet given at that time by Count Walewski , who seems to
12. Ibid., February 15, 1856, p. 8.
13. Ibid., February 27, 1856, p. 9. (Taken from the Moniteur )
.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., February 25, 1856. p. 10.
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have been prodigal of banquets.
Their sessions were behind closed doors and little could be
learned of the progress made, as secrecy was maintained through-
out. They did not meet daily nor even on alternate days, but at
the times which would suit their convenience most. An interest-
ing side light is reported by The Times correspondent at Vienna,
in regard to the feeling there. Prince Gortschakoff was the
Ambassador to Austria and had failed to maintain that country
in a state of neutrality, as he had been expected to do. And
now that Austria had sent the ultimatum to St. Petersburg, and
the Czar had chosen others to represent him at the Congress,
Prince Gortschakoff was in no very happy frame of mind. There-
fore, when it was reported in Vienna that at one of the many
social functions Emperor Napoleon III. had given slight attention
to Count Buol in his speech, but had brought into strong relief
Lord Clarendon, Count Cavour, and even Count Orloff ; and, when
about this time he received a summons to return to St. Petersburg,
he let his feelings control his tongue. He is said to have de-
clared that there was not a more despicable set of politicians
in Europe than were to be found in that imperial city. It was
said that he did not spare Austria, when conversing with his
friends, because Russia had "piped" and Austria "had refused to
dance . "-^
The correspondents for the newspapers were constantly watch-
ing and listening for any information of interest; and thus we
have it reported on Monday, March 10, that, at a fete given for
16. Ibid^ ;v.R,rch llj 1856. p., 11. (Vienna correspondent).
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the Plenipotentiaries at the Palace of the Tuileries the evening
before, a piece in two acts was performed after dinner. This
little drama was entitled "Il_ n'y a_ pas de grange sans Feu ", which
may or may not have had something to do with the episode report-
ed. It seems that the attention of almost the whole audience
was attracted to two spectators who retired "to a distant part
of the salon and to all appearances kept up a dialogue, which
was perhaps less comic than what was spoken on the stage, but
which was quite as interesting. These two were Count Orloff
17
and Count Buol." Count Orloff showed supreme and vehement
disgust and his gesticulations were threatening; while Count
Buol met his demonstrations as diplomatically as possible. They
held the attention of the audience until the drama was almost
finished
.
But, although secrecy remained the policy of the Congress,
the fact that a peace was really being made leaked out in
several ways. The Plenipotentiaries were known to have decided
to come to an understanding on all those points involving a
casus belli and to leave all secondary matters for later atten-
tions. Therefore in an indirect way it was possible to learn
that peace was assured as early as the 12th of March. The
French correspondent of The Times included a letter from Berlin
of that date saying "Count Orloff has made known at St. Peters-
burg that a definitive understanding has been come to on
the fifth point, and that, , peace is assured".
18 Ard
17. Ibid., March 12, 1856, p. 9.
18. Ibid., March 15, p. 10.
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Napoleon III. was anxious to have peace announced at the same
time that the firing of cannon announced the birth of a son.
The birth of the son occurred on March 16th, but the Plenipoten-
tiaries were not yet ready to announce the peace, although they
were practical.! y through with the more important details, and
the broken off understanding, together with the disappointment
of the Emperor, led to a general knowledge that peace was at
. , 19hand.
Influence of the Sultan.
The Sultan was not pleased with several of the tentative
arrangements which the Congress had made respecting Turkey, he
therefore refused to sanction some of these and called a council
at Constantinople. This Council directed Aali Pasha "not to
consent to the insertion of the Sultan's late decree among the
articles of peace." He objected to any arrangement by which
the Powers were to dictate the administration of any portion of
the internal affairs of the Turkish Government ; and this decree,
in regard to the Rayah subjects of the Sultan, affected internal
affairs only, Again a discussion by the Congress of the union
of the two provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia he considered
prejudicial to his sovereign rights." After several days of
considerable excitement in Constantinople, "in spite of long
interviews between the French and Austrian Ambassadors and the
Ministers of the Porte," a protest was sent to the Congress. The
Sultan practically gained his point, at least temporarily, and
19. Ibid., March 19, 1856, p. 8.
20. Ibid., March 26, 1856, p. 6.
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the matter was settled amicably. 21
And as regards the daring to assume a high end exalted place
among the Plenipotentiaries Aali Pasha had no lack; for he
issued 800 invitations to a grand ball to be held on the 10th
of April, at which the Emperor was to be a guest, exactly as the
Sultan had been a guest at a similar ball given by M. Thouvenel
at Constantinople, shortly before. Moreover, he modelled his
affair upon that which the Empress had given at the Tuileries
in celebration of the birth of the heir to the imperial throne. 22
Gradual Changes in Relationships
.
As the work of the Congress proceeded it became evident to
Count Orloff that Napoleon was the real leader in European af-
fairs and he was diplomatic enough to change his policy so as
to benefit by the forming of a more friendly attitude. The facts
are that Napoleon had been pushing to the front for some time as
is shown well in an article in the Spectator for December 15, 1855
entitled, "Peace and the French Alliance", which said in part:
"Louis Napoleon is no longer the parvenu , excluded from the re-
cognized synod of royalties, whom Nicholas of Russia would not
greet with the title of fre re : he is without any question the
foremost man in Europe - the man whose single will can do more
than any other will, whose abilities and character are recognized
most unmistakably to belong to the first order, whose alliance
is eagerly welcomed If the war should terminate
without giving our navy an opportunity to retrieve the comparative
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., April 4, 1856, p. 10.
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inaction and want of daring that have characterized the last two
campaigns, Englishmen will naturally feel a passing wish that
it might have been otherwise If the hatred and envy
of Continental powers have found in actual disasters ground
enough for absurd misconception or at least misstatements of the
decline of England's military power, one might, without being
considered bloodthirsty, wish for another campaign to test what
we could do, now that the surprise of the war has worn off, and
the nation is thoroughly roused to a sense of the importance of
the struggle. 1,25
The sentiment expressed in the latter half of the above
quotation gives one cause for the alienation of England and the
growing affinity of France for Russia. How different was the
sentiment expressed in Paris may be seen readily from an article
on the "Necessity of a Congress for Pacifying Europe" dated Paris,
December 20, 1855, and published in the Living Age . From this
article is taken the following: "In the plans of arrangement now
in course of negotiation no one has any idea of humiliating
Russia, or depreciating the just share of influence and authority
which she is called on to preserve in the councils of Europe." 2^
And Fyffe, quoting a Russian source, says, "In the course of the
deliberation, whenever our (Russian) plenipotentiaries found
themselves in the presence of insurmountable difficulties, they
appealed to the personal intervention of the sovereign (Napoleon)
23. Littell's Living Age. Feb. 9, 1856, pp. 380-2. Quoted from
The Spectator , Dec. 15, 1855.
24. Ibid., Peb. 16, 1856, pp. 433-5.
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and had only to congratulate themselves on the result." 25
The above sentiments seem to have been corroborated by
those expressed by Count Walewski on the occasion of a banquet
given him on the 31st of March, just after the treaty had been
signed. Besides the plenipotentiaries the French Cabinet and
other high functionaries of State were invited; in all there
were about 40 people in attendance. Count Walewski presided
and Lord Clarendon and Count Buol took their usual places next
to him, but the other plenipotentiaries alternated themselves
with the members of the diplomatic corps. The plenipotentiaries
were in full uniform and wore decorations of the orders to which
they belonged. On this very solemn occasion Count Walewski pro-
posed a toast saying that he drank to the duration of the peace
they had just signed, all the more as that peace was effected
without inflicting humiliation on anyone, and was a peace worthy
of the nations which had made it; it was humbling to no one,
and highly honorable to all. 26 Count Orloff was expected to
reply to this sentiment but he refrained from doing so and the
one speech of Count Walewski was the topic of conversation for
the rest of the evening with considerable speculation in regard
to why Count Orloff remained silent. But the next report said,
"The Emperor continues to be marked in his attentions to the
Russian Envoys, and the Russian Envoys still more enthusiastic
25. Fyffe, Fist, of Mod . Europe , Vol. III., p. 250. Quoted from
Dip. Study II. 577, (a Russian publication).
26. The Times, April 5, 1856, p. 7."
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in their admiration of His Majesty." 2^
Continuing in the same vein it is well to take something
from the Vienna correspondent of The Times
:
"Not long since the
Austrians were loud in their eulogies of the Emperor of the
French, but the evident desire of that potentate to ingratiate
himself with Russia has excited both their jealousy and their
fears. Men in office are extremely guarded in their conversa-
tion, but they are in an ill temper, and hint that the trench
Government has not paid sufficient attention to some of the
wishes expressed by the representatives of His Majesty the
Emperor Francis Joseph. It is also a great grievance to the
official politicians of this city that the Sardinian Plenipoten-
tiaries have been permitted to play such a prominent part at
the Paris conferences, and that Count Orloff has taken so much
notice of Count Cavour, 'the Minister of a country which, for
the last eight years, has displayed such a hostile feeling to-
wards Austria'. As a consequence of this feeling Austria
ceased to flatter the French and to abuse England since she
perceived that a Russo-French Alliance was not beyond the bounds
of probability. Count Crloff continued to take advantage of
every opportunity to show favors to Count Cavour and it was evi-
dent that the very name of Austria was an offense to him.^
As stated above,'"" Sardinia had never beer recognized by
Russia and it was amusing to see Count Orloff now so friendly,
27. Ibid., April
28. Ibid., April
29. Ibid., April
See page 26.
5, 1856, p. 10.
10, 1856, p. 9.
14, 1856, p. 10.

But when it is understood that it was through Austrian influence
that Russia had ignored the Government of Sardinia, the whole
matter is as light as day. The facts were that Austria was
"becoming almost completely isolated and at the above mentioned
great f£te at the Ottoman Embassy it was remarked that Count
Buol was hardly addressed by anyone. 50 After the treaty had
been signed and the Plenipotentiaries were waiting for the rati-
fications to be sent in, they were concerned about a number of
minor subjects which thus far had been omitted from their de-
liberations on account of the necessity for speed. It was durin
this interval that Count Cavour succeeded in pressing his in-
terests to the front, and through the Emperor's influence, had
the Italian question brought formally before the Congress.
It is reported that Count Cavour displayed great courage,
zeal, and perseverance during the whole trying period that the
Congress continued to meet. And although he secured no definite
concessions nor even reliable promises yet he had placed the
Italian question fairly before Europe in such a strong light
that it was evident to all that results favorable to Italy would
likely follow in the near future. On the other hand wretched
Austria was bearing a burden equal to that usually carried in
such a Congress by a vanquished Power. To give an opportunity
to understand the situation one can not do better than to quote
the words of the Paris correspondent of The Times :
"At a dinner given by Prince Napoleon the other evening
30. Ibid., April 19, 1856, p. 10.
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neither M. de Buol, M. Hubner, nor M.de leurqueney, who is,
justly or unjustly, regarded as decidedly Austrian in his tenden-
cies, was present, It is difficult to suppose that
this omission was not known, or disapproved by the Emperor."51
Again he says: BM. Cavour left Paris last night, and has, I
suppose, before this reached London, Count Buol leaves today
for Vienna. These two Plenipotentiaries carry very different feel-
ings with them as they separate. The former has cause to be proud
of the position his Government occupies before Europe, and he
cannot be otherwise than satisfied with the manner in which he
himself has performed the arduous duties confided to him. He
may look back on the past with pleasure, and to the future with
hope. Count Buol returns sullenly home, conscious that he has
conciliated no one, and stung by the thought that, in the council
room or out of it, his Government was an object of suspicion to
all She is disliked and feared by Prussia, hated
intensely by Russia, all but defied by Piedmont, probably de-
spised by trance, and most assuredly not loved by England; but
the enmity of Russia probably causes her more pain than anything
else
.
31. Ibid., April 19, 1856, p. 10.
32. Ibid., April 21, 1856, p. 10. Continuing, the correspondent
said:
Hardly an occasion passed that Count Orloff did not show
his resentment or insinuate contempt - not the less keen be-
cause conveyed in polished terms - for the Government of which
Count Buol was the representative at the Congress. This
occurred in various ways. It is certain that when the Russian
Plenipotentiary asked one day of Count Cavour, in a good-
humoured expostulating manner, "what could have induced
Sardinia to make war on Ivussia?" Count Cavour replied that
Russia had never recognized the constitutional Government of
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Related -vents.
The feeling of assurance that a successful termination of
the war was at hand caused the allied Governments to send order
raising all measures of blockade which were keeping Russian com
mercial vessels in neutral ports. 33 This was done as early as
April 4th, although the final ratification of the treaty did not
occur until the 27th. 34 The allies also withdrew many of their
troops from Russian and Turkish territory as early as their
action in raising the blockade. 35
Count Orloff seemed to be on very friendly terms with the
Ambassador from Spain, M. Olozaga, and there was a rumor that he
would probably recommend to the Czar the recognition of the
32. (con't). Piedmont, and spoke and acted as if, in fact,
Piedmont had ceased to exist, and that she was obliged to
declare war, if it were only to prove that she was still
alive and moving. "My dear Count" said the Russian, "if
we did not recognize you it was those Jesuits of Austrians
(clinching his hand) who prevented us."
At a grand banquet given one day by the President of the
- Senate to the Plenipotentiaries at the Luxembourg Count
Orlof'f and Count Buol were standing near each other looking
at some beautiful malachite vases, said to have been the
gift of the Emperor Alexander to the first Napoleon. The
Russian drew the attention of his Austrian colleague to
some of the pictures with which the room was hung, and
which represented the battle of Austerlitz, and others in
which the Austrians more particularly figured, but not to
their glory, during the wars of the Empire. "Look here,
Count, said Orloff , "these ought to interest you more
than me." Count Buol looked, and smiled grimly; "Never
mind - never mind", Orloff continued, "I am sure these pic-
tures were not left here expressly to awaken any unpleasant
reminiscences in your mind or to vex you. Our hosts are
too delicate to pain you. The servants no doubt forgot to
remove these pictures, though they knew you ?irere coming;
but don't mind - don't mind^" The consolation was the un-
kindest cut of all.
33. Ibid., April 5, 1856, p. 9.
34. Ibid., April 29, 1856, p. 12.
35. Ibid., April 7, 1856, p. 10.
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Government of Queen Isabella of Spain, which the Czar had neg-
lected, much as he had done for Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia. It
will be remembered also that Nicholas attempted to refuse recogni-
tion to Napoleon a few years earlier; and it may be asserted
without hesitancy that the war and the Congress had taught the
Russian Government a much needed lesson in diplomatic courtesy.
The Ratification .
To Prince Lichtenstein v/as assigned the duty of bearing
Czar Alexander's ratification of the treaty to Paris. 36 But just
how the other copies were carried to and from the capitals of the
Powers concerned is not to be learned readily. The Vienna corres-
pondent of The Times reported the Post Amt Gazette as saying:
"The treaty of peace, with the Imperial signature attached
to it, will be sent to Paris immediately. The treaty is written
on parchment, with the first page only lithographed. Each copy
is. enclosed in an elegant leather case, the great seal being in
a gilt box." 37 From the above statement it is possible to know
there was special care as to the form and the appearance of the
several copies of the important document as well as to the content
of it. And it may be of interest here to mention the high com-
pliment paid to Empress Eugenia when the treaty was signed. She
had taken a feather from an eagle in the Jardin des Plantes and had
had a pen made from this feather. At her request the treaty was
signed with this pen; and then, after having been decorated with
emblems by the Crown jeweller, it was presented to her with the
36. Ibid., April 26, 1856, p. 11.
£Za Tlu.ri,,
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compliments of the Plenipotentiaries. 38
Immediately after the treaty had been signed at 2 o'clock
on the afternoon of March 30, 1856, the Plenipotentaries left
the Foreign Office and proceeded to the Palace of the Tuileries,
to communicate the fact to the Emperor, who, attended by the
officers of his household, received them in the Salon des Ambassa-
deurs
.
In many ways, no doubt, the event of closing their labors
was a happy one for all; and for some at least, a time to be
remembered with pride. Even Baron Von Manteuffel, who had been
present but a few days, received recognition from his Sovereign
in the conferring upon him of the order of the Black Eagle, the
highest order in Prussia and one of which there is only one class.
This honor was given not so much because of the participation
in the Congress as in appreciation of his success in steering the
ship of State through all the vicissitudes of the times without
wrecking it on the rocks of war or letting it run aground in an
alliance with Kussia.° And by Imperial decree the President
of the Congress Count Walewski was raised to the rank of Grand
Cross of the Legion of Honor for the "eminent services which he
had rendered as Minister of foreign Affairs." And his colleague
the Baron de Bourqueney ;vas given "the dignity of senator for
his services during the late diplomatic negotiations." Emperor
Francis Joseph had not forgotten his representatives, much as
they were being slighted at Paris, for he sent Count Buol the
38. Barcn d'Ambes. Intimate Memoirs of Napoleon III . V. II* ,p. 86.
39. The Times
.
^pril 3, 1856, p. 7. TBerlin correspondent)
L 4 0. Ib^Q fah_^jaj^J^, fc.J.j^lafi, . n. 7. (Pari P. p.nrrftspnn dfir]t.)
,
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Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stephen and a highly complimentary
autograph letter.
The actual number of times of meeting while in the perform-
ance of their duties as a Congress, is not to be determined
readily, but apparently they met 18 times between the 25th of
February, the date of their first meeting, and the 30th of March,
the date of signing the treaty. After this date they met a number
of times and were busily engaged with minor points, the most im-
portant being the disposition of Italy and of the Provinces of
Wallachia and Moldavia. These and other subjects considered will
be discussed in the next chapter. The social affairs, in which
a great part of their time and attention was engaged, probably
numbered as many as the business sessions of the Congress; and
considering all the relationships, friendships, and jealousies,
to say nothing of the premeditated and intentional slights which
these affairs fostered, it is not an exaggeration to say that
their effect upon European conditions was fully equal to that of
the Congress itself. It seems fitting, too, to mention once
more the very great influence which the then popular Emperor
41. Tbid., April 10, 1856, p. 9. (Vienna Correspondent).
• There may have been others who received decorations, though
the following is the only further record obtained:
The Emperor, (Napoleon), it appears, was very anxious to
give his Lordship (Clarendon) the Grand. Cross of the Legion
of Honour, an honor which M. de Manteuffel has already re-
ceived. Lord Clarendon, (so the story runs) explained to
His Majesty that no British Minister or British subject can
accept a foreign decoration unless for military services;
"and such being the fact", he added, "my case has not an
inch of ground to stand on, as my services in Paris have
been especially pacific." - Taken from the letter of the
Paris correspondent of The Times , published April 21, 1856,
page 10.
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Napoleon III. and his gay capital, the birth of his heir at the
critical moment, and his close diplomatic, official, and personal
associations with a majority of the members had upon the final
draft of the treaty. By April 27, 1856, the ratifications had all
been received and acknowledged, the work of the memorable Congress
had been concluded, and they therefore adjourned sine die and
went their several ways rejoicing, though evidently not in equal
measure.
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CHAPTER III. THE TREATY.
I. Contents of the Treaty.
As soon as the treaty was ratified and the ratifications all
filed in Paris, as it had been prescribed, the Honorable William
Stuart, the first attache to Her Brittanic Majesty's Embassy at
Paris, was despatched to London with a copy of the long expected
document. The London Gazette immediately published it as an
"Extra", the issue appearing on the 28th. 1
The treaty itself contained 54 articles and one additional
and transitory article in reference to the Straits and evacuation
of troops. Annexed to the treaty are several conventions - the
first containing 4 articles; the second, 5 articles; the third,
2 articles; and the fourth 1 article on four very important points
of international maritime law.
The first article consists of a formal and dignified declara-
tion of peace and friendship between the belligerents, "their heirs
and successors, their respective dominions and subjects, in per-
petuity," as soon as ratifications are made.
The second article provides for the reciprocal evacuation
of all territories occupied by the armies, as promptly as possible,
according to special arrangements to be made.
The third provides for hussian restoration of the citadel of
Rars and other Turkish territory captured during the war.
The fourth engages the allies to surrender and evacuate the
towns and ports of Sebastopol, Balaklava, Kamiesch, Eupatoria,
1. The Times, April 29, 1856. p. 12.
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Kertch, Yenikale, Kinburn, and all other Russian territories
occupied by their troops.
The fifth promises a blanket amnesty to all who may have
been in any way compromised by the war in so far as their partici-
pation in it may have been favorable to the enemy.
The sixth provides for the immediate release of all prisoners
of war.
The seventh is an important article; for it is here that the
Christian Powers pledge themselves to permit the Sublime Porte "to
participate in the advantages of the public law and system of Eu-
rope", and "to respect the independence and territorial integrity
of the Ottoman Empire." Moreover, they guarantee in common "the
strict observance of that engagement" and promise that they will
consider any act tending to its violation as a question of "general
interest . "^
And the eighth article was hoped to be an exceptionally wise
and useful one for the preservation of peace, in that it provided
for delay and opportunity for the intervention of all the other
interested parties in case of any misunderstanding which might
arise between two or more of the signatories. Like all other ef-
forts of like kind it has proven ineffectual; the apparent result
being to increase the difference of potential by the delay, and
thus make the strode all the more violent when it comes.
In the ninth is found the result of the consummate diplomatic
skill of the Sultan and his two Envoys, Aali Pasha and Mehemmed
Djemil Bey. Like the policy of the German Government toward the
2. Taken from the text of the treaty as found in The Times , April
29, 1SL/6, p. 12.
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Socialists of the present day, - to grant, in an Imperial way, so
many of the demands of the Socialists that little is left for a
propaganda - the Porte communicated to the Western Poivers and
Russia that wonderful firman the "Hatti-humayun" of 1856, spon-
taneously emanating from it, and furnishing convincing proof of
constant solicitude for the welfare of all the subjects of the
empire without respect to race or religion. To say that the en-
voys from the Christian Powers must have been overfed with nourish-
ment not convenient for them or that they were suffering from the
results of keeping late hours, or both, is to give but a very
paltry excuse for their collective agreement to recognize the high
value of this communication and to pledge themselves not to inter-
fere collectively nor separately with the internal administration
of the empire.
The tenth declares that the "Convention of the Straits" is
revised by common consent and as revised is annexed to the treaty
to have as full effect and force as if a part of the treaty itself.
The eleventh and twelfth articles neutralize the Black Sea
and throw it open to the merchant marine of every nation but close
it to the naval vessels of all the world except for health, customs
and policing purposes, as further detailed in articles 14 and 19
of the treaty. Russia and Turkey agree to admit consuls into
Black Sea ports in conformity to the principles of international
law.
The thirteenth is a relinquishment by Turkey and Russia of
any rights they may have had to maintain on the shores of the Black
Sea any military-maritime arsenals.
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The fourteenth declares that Russia and Turkey have signed a
convention in regard to the number and character of vessels to be
maintained for the above mentioned duties at the ports of the Black
Sea and that this convention is annexed to the treaty, to be an-
nulled or modified only by the assent of all the Powers who are
signatories of the main treaty.
The fifteenth applies the principles of the free navigation
of rivers which separate different States, as laid down by the
Congress of Vienna, to the Danube Kiver; and provides that with
the exception of levies tor policing, guaranteeing, and facili-
tating traffic "no obstacle whatever shall be opposed to free
navigation.
"
The sixteenth provides for a European commission consisting
of one delegate from each of the seven Powers to see that the sand
bars and other obstructions at the delta of the river are removed;
and gives the Commission power to fix a rate of toll to reimburse
them for the expenses necessary. The Commission is to be con-
trolled by a majority vote and the flags of all nations are to be
treated by it "on a footing of perfect equality."
The seventeenth provides for a permanent hiver Commission
to take charge of the navigation of the Danube when the Commission
of the sixteenth article has finished its work. This permanent
Commission is to consist of seven members, one each from Austria,
Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Turkey and also one each from the three
Danubian Principalities, the nomination of whom has been approved
by the Sublime Porte. Its duties as given are as follows:
1. To prepare regulations of navigation and river police.
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2. To remove any impediments to navigation, still remaining^
which prevent the application of the principles laid down by the
Treaty of Vienna.
3. To execute the necessary works throughout the whole course
of the river.
4. To maintain the mouths of the Danube and the neighboring
ports of the sea in a navigable state.
The eighteenth requires that the European Commission shall
have finished its work in two years; and that the River Commission
shall have done all that is named in numbers 1, and 2, Art. 17,
within the same two years. Further it requires that at the end
of the two years the European Commission shall be dissolved and
its duties automatically turned over to the River Commission by
the Powers assembled in conference.
The nineteenth grants to each of the contracting Powers the
right to station two light vessels at the mouths of the Danube to
secure the execution of the regulations of the River Commission.
The twentieth "rectifies" the frontier between Russia and
Turkey in the Province of Bessarabia, giving the mouths of the
river back to Turkey; and provides that delegates of the contract-
ing Powers shall fix the line in detail.
In the twenty-first provision is made for the territory ceded
in that it is to be considered a part of the Province of Moldavia.
The inhabitants are given the choice of remaining where they are
or of departing within three years, and perfect freedom in the
disposition of their property.
The twenty-second is an important article in that it leaves
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the Provinces of Wallachis and Moldavia under the suzerainty of
the Porte, but imposes the collective guarantee of the Powers. It
expressly forbids any one of the guaranteeing Powers to exercise
exclusive protection over the Principalities and to acquire any
separate right of interference in their internal affairs. This,
therefore, gives the Principalities autonomy but not complete in-
dependence. Evidently, Russia and Turkey were both being checked
in their ambitions, while Austria was not assisted in hers.
The twenty-third article guarantees to the Principalities an
"independent and national administration as well as full liberty
of worship, of legislation, of commerce, and of navigation." But
it proposes to revise the laws and statutes and for that purpose
arranges for a commission to meet at Bucharest without delay.
The twenty-fourth provides for a Divan in each of the Pro-
vinces to be convoked by the Sultan for the purpose of determin-
ing the wishes of the inhabitants in regard to the organization
to be effected. The relation of these Divans to the Commission
at Bucharest is to be provided by the Congress; so it says,
though where or what they are, is not clear, unless they be found
in the first section of the following article. Here we find the
Commission is simply required to take "into consideration the
opinion expressed by the two Divans" and to "transmit without de-
lay to the present seat of the conferences (presumably Paris) the
result of its own labours." Article twenty five goes on to say:
"The final agreement with the Suzerain Power shall be recorded
in a convention to be concluded at Paris between the high contract-
ing parties; and a hatti-sherif in conformity with the stipulations
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of the convention shall constitute definitely the organization
of those provinces placed thence-forward under the collective
guarantee of all the signing Powers."
By the twenty-sixth article permission is given to the
Principalities to maintain an army for purely police and defensive
purposes; and the following article places one more prohibition
upon Turkey in that it denies to her the right to assist the
jj
provincial army in putting down an insurrection without first com-
ing to an understanding with the contracting Powers.,
With this parting injunction, the Principality of Servia is
next considered; and two articles, the twenty-eighth and twenty-
ninth, stipulate terms very similar to those for the Danubian
Provinces, guaranteeing as much and checking Turkish intervention
equally.
Article thirty declares the Asiatic frontier between Russia
and Turkey is to remain as it was before the war; but, to prevent
any possibility of dispute, provides for a Commission to establish
the line definitely. This Commission consists of two Russian, two
Turkish, one English, and one French representative, and is to
complete its work within eight months after the ratification of
the treaty.
The evacuation of territory by the several Powers is by the
thirty-first article fully arranged for and promptness is empha-
sized.
By the thirty-second the commercial treaties in existence
before the war are revived, and it is stipulated that "in all other
matters their subjects shall be respectively treated upon the foot-
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ing of the most favoured nation."
The thirty-third speaks of the annexed convention between
England and France on the one side and hussia on the other, in re-
spect to the disposition of the Aland Islands in the Baltic Sea.
It is declared to have the same force and validity as if a part
of the main treaty.
The last article, the thirty-fourth, provides that the rati-
fications shall take place within four weeks, or sooner if possible,
and shall be exchanged at Paris where the Plenipotentiaries will
wait for them. Since the treaty was signed March 30th with the
ratifications exchanged April 27th it is evident that the four
weeks were none too long for the accomplishment of the task.
The signatures were placed in alphabetical order by countries,
the same as the seating at the table while at work; except that
France took its proper place alphabetically instead of at the
head and the foot, and that England exchanged with Austria -
England taking first place and Austria second - for some reason
which can only be conjectured, possibly because Count Buol felt
that under the circumstances he did not desire the prominence of
first place.
*
The additional and transitory article simply provided that the
convention regarding the Straits should not apply to the vessels
of war performing the acts of evacuation, but should take effect
when evacuation was complete.
This convention of the Straits is a short one of four articles
in which the Sultan agrees to retain his former prohibition of
foreign war vessels from entering the Dardanelles and Bosporus,
Or because in French Arigleterre would precede Austriche
.
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while the Powers guarantee their respect for that principle; but
two exceptions are named - for the light vessels in the service
of the missions of foreign powers, and those which have just been
authorized to station themselves at the mouths of the Danube "to
secure the execution of the regulations relative to the liberty of
that river, and the number of which is not to exceed two for each
Power.
"
The second convention which is annexed to the treaty is one
between Russia and Turkey; each of these is to maintain on the
Black Sea a maximun of six steam vessels of 50 meters length and
800 tons displacement and four smaller vessels not to exceed 200
tons displacement each.
The third convention is the one which refers to the Aland
Islands. It stipulates that these islands "shall not be fortified
and that no military or naval establishment shall be maintained
or created there." With this convention the work of the Congress,
as such, closes; but the same men remained at the task of providing
for their respective countries what they believed would be of
benefit, and Yfhich they thought would accord with the spirit of
their duties, even if not exactly with the letter of their in-
structions. To this end they drew up .what has since been named
the Declaration of Paris. Its purpose was to put an end to a
number of deplorable disputes in regard to international maritime
law in time of war. Its provisions were:
1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished.
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, ?/ith the exception
of contraband of war.
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3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are
not liable to capture under enemy's flag.
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective - that
is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent
access to the coast of the enemy.
This declaration was signed on April 16th and the Plenipotentiaries
agreed to invite the nations not represented to accede to it.
Notwithstanding its value and its evident promotion of civiliza-
tion, the United States of America found excuses for declining to
be one of the many nations which acceded to it.'*
* The text of the treaty is found in The Times , Apr. 29, 1856,
p. 12. Also in the original French language in Marten's Nouv
Recueil GeWral DeTrait^s XV., 770-92.
I
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II. Criticisms of the Treaty.
The Delay in Becoming Public.
The long delay occasioned by the waiting for ratifications
made it necessary for the monthly magazines to get out their May
numbers without further knowledge of the treaty than what had
chanced to leak out accidentally. The publishers were not in a
state of mind to be pleased over small favors. This is illustrated
by the Tait's Edinburgh Magazine where it says:
"The treaty of peace should have been long ere now described
to the British Parliament. Its terms have been communicated to
European Courts, whose subjects never spent a thaler or lost a
drop of blood in the war." 3
This may have referred to a belief that Austria and Prussia had
more knowledge of it than England.
There seems to prevail a feeling in England that the peace
which was being made was one to be ashamed of; this is shown in
an article by Walter Savage Landor entitled "The Peace Negotiations "
published in the Living Age . In this he says: "was it ever
agreed that a purse should never be taken from the grasp of a
pickpocket, that his honor not be wounded? We are leaving the
picklock keys and the revolver in each hand of an assassin, and
seem perfectly sure he will not fire at us when we turn our backs,
nor ever attempt to commit burglary again. "^
Again it is reported that a politician, not in the Congress
but present at one of the many social functions immediately follow-
3. Tait ' s Edinburgh Mag , may 1856, p. 257.
4. Living Aize, April 5, 1856, p. 63. (Originally published in The
Examiner)
.
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ing the signing of the treaty, said that the Plenipotentiaries had
signed "une Pai x but not la Paix . And in the same vein an
article of the time contained the following lines:
"To-morrow would have given us all--
Repaid our pangs, repaired our fall;
Guerdon of many a painful hour,
To-morrow would have given us power
To rule, to shine, to smile, to save—
And the Conference at Paris have decided that that morrow is not
to be ours." Lord Derby denounced the act as "The Capitulation
of Paris." 7
An article entitled The Peace gives an idea of the reception
of the treaty in England. Among other like statements are found
the following:
"Parliament reassembled to hear the announcement with less
excitement than precedes many a second-rate party-debate; and the
Premier, usually so punctual, that day by accident (?) came too
late to make his statement at the proper time and finally an-
nounced the Peace with hardly a congratulatory word, and to a
thin House I" 8
It seemed to be understood that the treaty was itself quite ob-
jectionable, even if the failure of the British army and navy
to make a good showing should be neglected. The same article has
this to say on the treaty.
5. The .examiner
,
April 5, 1S56, p. 209.
6. The Economist , April 5, 1856, pp. 568-9.
7. Sidney Lee, Diet , of National Biog . XX., pp. 347-50.
8. Blackwood* s Edinburgh Magazine, V. 79. Jan. to June 1856, p. 608,
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"The so-called 'neutralization' of the Black Sea now agreed
to by the Allies, is the very scheme of equipoise rejected by
them at the Vienna Conferences a year ago; and as to the stipula-
tion for the non-fortification of the Aland Isles, it must be
remembered that the system of earth works adopted by Todleben
allows of the strongest fortifications being erected anywhere in
a few weeks." 9 Even as early as 1856, therefore, the trench war-
fare, about which we now hear so much, was understood to be the
coming type.
From an address by Major-General Sir Richard Airey, Quarter-
master of the l 1 orces, another shade of color is given. He says:
"What may be called the domestic bearing of Great Britain
during the late war will not read well in history. It was too
confident at the beginning, too exulting towards the middle, and
too desponding towards the end." And another shade may well
be given. At an effort to celebrate with illuminations and fire-
works, a man in the West-End "exhibited a transparency, in which,
within a broad black border, was seen a legend to this effect:
'In mourning for a disgraceful peace, the inevitable result of a
disgracefully conducted war'." But the comment was that, although
the mob seemed to like his courage, it was only "a small minority
who took such a gloomy view of the peace as this gentleman did."
But there were other counsels; not every criticism was of the
character given above. To give a few of the saner criticisms by
9. Ibid., p. 615.
10. North Brit ish nev iew , V. XXV., p. 493.
11 . British Quarterly neview , V. 24, p. 209.
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British writers, is necessary to the real understanding of the
situation. Here is one that shows moderation:
"Every candid person, we think, must agree with us in saying
that, so far, the Treaty, if not ail that might have been desired,
is all that could well have been expected. All the provisions
are in the right direction.
And this criticism from another and probably a still saner source
is more nearly the truth, in all probability than most of the
others
:
"That all parties are heartily tired of the war, has been
for many months past evident; and certainly of all the belligerents
Russia has the most reason to be so But both England
and France have also many and cogent reasons for desiring peace.
Another article entitled "The New Loan and Funding of Exchequer
Bills", in the same magazine, gives the financial condition of
England at the time:
"Should, as is contrary to general belief, the negotiations
commenced in Paris not be carried to a successful conclusion, there
will be "no other resource for the Government but to raise addi-
tional money through a loan or largely augment the existing rates
of taxation." ^
But the hconomist seems optimistic in regard to the treaty
as a whole and wildly so in regard to the worst feature of the
entire document. By becoming too enthusiastic where there is
evident reason to be calm the criticism given loses much in value.
12. Ibid., p. 226.
13. The Bankers' Magazine , V. XVI., Feb. 1856, p. 74.
14. TbTd., karch 1856, pp. 141-2.
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This is the way the periodical delivers itself:
"We rejoice to see that the Allies have given up the unfortun-
ate idea once entertained of degrading the Power they took up
arms to aid, by establishing a right of interference between its
subjects and itself, wholly irreconcilable with the principle of
real sovereignty.""^
However, in a later issue this periodical gives some very worthy
and pertinent criticisms that help materially to lift the Congress
out of the rather discreditable position in which some would
declare it to be. These are given under "Parliamentary Discussions
on the Treaty of Peace." One of these is to the effect that few
treaties had been so unanimously accepted by the members of the
English parliament. Reference is made to the treaties of Utrecht,
1713, of Paris, 1763, and 1783, of Amiens, 1802, and of Paris,
1814, all of which "gave rise to acrimonious discussions and
protracted party conflicts." Another states the position which
the treaty imposed upon Russia in these words:
"By some clauses in the treaty we remove her (Russia's)
temptations for encroachment; by others we diminish her facilities
for encroachment; by a third class we destroy her excuses for
encroachment; while by a fourth class we convince her that she
cannot encroach either with success or impunity."
Some writers claimed that Russia should have been forced to
pay a large indemnity as a security for the observance of the
treaty, professing to believe that a large addition to the public
15. The Economist
,
May 3, 1856, pp. 475-4.
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debt of that country would act as a "grand civilizer." Besides
being required to return to Turkey the costs of the last Russian
invasion which Turkey had been forced to pay, the Russian "should
have been chained down to a debt that could not have been easily
paid." But Russia was not required to pay an indemnity nor to
perform any other act humiliating to her pride, except the cession
17
of a portion of Bessarabia back to Turkey. The source of the
18leniency toward Russia was conceded to be France. And as for
the failure of Russia, it could not have been otherwise, when so
great a coalition had been formed against her. A large public
debt was really not necessary to put her on the road to civiliza-
tion. Her defeat was a sufficient blessing of that nature;
"Compression from without was probably indispensable to force the
cultivation of her powers within.
But others were even more willing to be fair with Russia
and contended that the cession of even a small portion of her
territory, together with the surrender of her supremacy on the
Black Sea, was sufficient to prove her genuine desire for peace.
And these were probably less overcome by false patroitism and pre-
20judice than those who would have humbled her more."
To continue the line of reasoning, expressed above, that
France was the source of leniency to Russia, it was felt by some
that Napoleon could see no real gain to him in a continuance of the
17. The Economist , V. 14, pp. 389-90.
18. Ibid., ;"ay 1856, p. 263.
19. The Economist , V. 14, pp. 389-90.
20. Brit. Quar. Rev. V. 24, pp. 217-20.
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war. tor a continuance would eventually bring about English
supremacy of the sea which could not be to the interest of Prance. 2
Besides, after the birth of an heir, Napoleon's policy of financ-
ing the war by means of loans so as to prevent large increase in
the taxes but which left a burden for future generations, failed
to look good to him longer. The prospect that his son might meet
difficulties which he had avoided made him see the matter in a
new light. 22 His rather rapid change to the leadership of the
friends of Russia caused alarm in England; and it is no wonder that
many considered the Anglo-French alliance as existing only as a
phrase - a memory of bygone days. 23
Count Walewski would have arranged for a union of the two
Provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, and he was supported by
Clarendon, Orloff, and Cavour, but Buol and Aali Pasha objected
and the matter was dropped. Another proposition of Count Walewski
was the request that something be done to suppress the Belgian
revolutionary periodicals that were considered extremely hostile
to the Government of France. But while they all vehemently con-
demned "the excesses in which the Belgian newspapers indulge with
impunity", yet they felt that nothing could be done about it
2.4
without the danger of a European War. Therefore this matter was
permitted to go unsettled, because Europe had had war enough. But
when Europe had rest from war until its horrors were too nearly
forgotten a similar condition between Austria and Servia was al-
21. Blackwood 1 s Edinburgh Mag . V. 79, P. 611.
22. Ibid., p. 613.
23. Brit . Quar . Rev. V. 24, p. 228.
24. Ibid., pp. 231-2.
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lowed to precipitate a most deplorable war.
Another matter which developed until it held the attention
of Europe more and which changed the map considerably within the
next fifteen years was brought forward by Count Cavour. As said
before, he had entered the war so as to be permitted to take part
in the Congress. But at the Congress no opportunity came for
him to present his case until the sub-committee was delegated to
draft the treaty. And even then he was a member of the committee
and had little chance to bring forward his propositions. However,
on the 27th of March he was given an opportunity to speak. 25 He
25. Ibid., pp. 253-7. To quote the words as given here:
"In this note the story of the wrongs and miseries of Italy,
under Austrian, domination and military occupation, Pontifical
tyranny, Neapolitan brutality, and French intervention, was
told over again in diplomatic language; and the Plenipoten-
tiaries were called upon to decide whether, having talked
in. such a high strain about the duty of maintaining the
integrity and promoting the welfare of a Mohammedan Empire,
and having shown such zeal for the practical attainment
of these objects, they could separate without extending a
little of the same enthusiasm and the same charity to Italy."
He did not ask that they do all that he would desire, but
recommended to their consideration the following:
1. The withdrawal of Austrian troops from those parts of
Italian territory held only by military usurpation.
2. The secularization of those parts of the Papal States
known as the Legations, that is, that regular government
officials be substituted for the atrocious Cardinals and
Jesuits
•
3. The recommendation by the Congress, with the whole
force of its moral weight, that Austria, Naples, and the
other native kingdoms establish " a more liberal and popular
mode of government in their respective dominions." Accord-
ing to another authority Cavour 's propositions were:
1. To relieve the Pope of temporal power.
2. To relieve the horrible conditions in the two Sicilies
through the allied Powers' influence.
3. To establish a customs union binding the Italian States
as the German Zollverein does the German States, - taken
from the North British Review V. 25., p. 260.
According to the Peris correspondent of The Times , Cavour
"showed the inconsistency of an occupation of territory,
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called upon the Plenipotentiaries to consider whether their so-
licitations for the Christians in Turkey and in other lands with-
out a thought for those nearer home was not a matter to be reformed.
But having done all that he could, which, by the way, was more
than any other man present would likely have been able to do for
a similarly heartfelt matter, "the Treaty was drawn up and signed,
without any mention being made in it of Italy."
As for Turkey, it has already been s?id that she failed to
secure an indemnity, a return for what she had paid Russia in
former wars, but it was said of her that she "fought well and
gained much - especially freedom from interference and permission
25. (con't). contrary to the will of its population, by foreign
troops, and dwelt on its inutility, and the impossibility
of such a state of things lasting for any time. In truth
a moment must come when such an anomaly must cease
A French army cannot forever occupy Rome; and if its
occupation be continued it ought to be to aid the Pope in
establishing necessary reforms in his internal administration"
J
published in The Times
,
April 14, 1856, p. 10. And on April,
19, 1856, p. 10 - "Austrian statesmen ridicule the idea of
Parma and Modena being annexed to Sardinia, and declare that
no territorial changes can be made in Italy unless by force
of arms." Also, April 8, pp. 8-9. "The domination of
Austria and the privileges of the priesthood were clearly
seen to be the chief impediments to prosperity both in
Piedmont and in the States of the Peninsula."
26. Ibid., p. 255.
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to join the concert of the Powers."27 The North British Review
gives quite a discussion of the effect of the treaty upon Turkey.
Her territory was enlarged and its integrity guaranteed. Her
military successes added much to her prestige, Politically, so
far as the control of the Principalities is concerned, she had
lost considerable of her former rights. Civil, racial, and re-
ligious rights were bettered both in the Empire at large and in
the Principalities; that is, so far as "scraps of paper" go. And
commercially she would gain with all the other nations by the
opening of the Elack Sea and the Danube Paver, to the traffic of
all nations. The double aim of that treaty rests in the consolida
tion of the Turkish Empire, against the arm at once of the ex-
28ternal violence and of internal revolution." The Bankers'
Magazine remarks "Constantinople is safe from the grasp of the
29Muscovite for at least a century to come."
On some points there was wide variation in the sentiments
expressed; as, for instance, the value to be attached to the
Sultan's firman which was made a part of the treaty. As already
given above the Economist seemed to think that matter a worthy one
while the British Quarterly Review considered it as amounting
"only to a new paper guarantee". But all the Powers were agreed
that the opening of the navigation of the Danube was a distinct
gain for humanity, irrespective of nationality or allegiance.
Austria was really disappointed in that the final treaty was so
nearly the same as that which Count Buol asked them to sign a year
27. The Economis t, V. 14~ pp. 389-90.
28. North British Review , V. 25, pp. 281-313.
29. The Bankers ' Iviag . V. XVI., pp. 73-78.
30. Brit. Guar. Rev. V. 24, p. 215.
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31
earlier, before so much shedding of blood, such havoc by disease,
and last, but not least ,before the shift to Paris and the decline
of Count Buol's influence. The British finally fell back and
declared the treaty was as good a settlement as they could have
expected under the circumstances. They gave Lord Clarendon credit
for the "Declaration of Paris" appended to the treaty and at first
felt it "a signal gain for Great Britain and a lasting service
to the cause of peace."32 But some of them doubted whether after
all they had not surrendered "a weapon of defense with which the
chief maritime and commercial power can ill afford to dispense."
Turning to later writers,
Andrews says, "the maintenance of the integrity and inde-
pendence of the Ottoman Empire, the admission of that State into
the concert of Europe, and the solemn renunciation of all right
of control over the internal affairs of the Empire itself, - was
probably the most ill-advised and suicidal diplomatic action that
has ever been taken by a body of representatives discussing in-
ternational questions." 33 The Turk he says "rejoiced to be free
from this surveillance of the foreign Powers". Continuing he
declares "no wonder Lord Stratford could say that he would rather
have cut off his right hand than have signed that treaty"
"The treaty of Paris not only postponed indefinitely the settle-
ment of the Eastern Question, but it increased tenfold the
difficulties of the problem." 3^
31. Liv. Age
. ,
May 31, 1856, pp. 566-7.
32. Sid". Lee, Diet , of fiat. Biog . V. XX., pp. 347-50.
33. Andrews, ;.'.od . Lurope , V . II., p. 87.
34. Ibid., p. 88.

83
And Pyffe says, "The terms of the Treaty were in fact such
as might have been imposed if the Western Powers had gone to war
with Russia for some object of their own, and had been rescued,
when defeated and overthrown, by the victorious interposition of
the Porte." 35
III. Conclusion
How insignificant and ephemeral all the efforts of man prove
to be is very clearly illustrated by the short life of the pro-
visions of the treaty under discussion; for "history has condemned
the policy of the war and stultified its triumphs." 56 Wallachia
and Moldavia were soon united in the independent kingdom of
Roumania, Servia threw off the Turkish yoke, Russia took occasion
in 1870, to repudiate the clause neutralizing the Black Sea. The
territory ceded by Russia was returned in 1878. Austria ignored
the agreement to respect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, by
annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other nations have done
likewise. The Danube clause, however, has been in the main car-
ried out. The firman which the Sultan used "to pull the wool
over the eyes" of all the distinguished Plenipotentiaries,, while
he had an opportunity and was clear sighted enough to recognize
the fact, was never put into practice fully. . The man who really
had seen the trend of the times was Nicholas I. and his policies
continued to be carried out after his death more than those of
the Treaty of Paris.
35. Pyffe, Hist
, of Mod
. Europe, V. ill, pp. 224-5.
36. Phillips, i».od
. Europe
, pp. 358-9.
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"The Sultan gained in importance from this war; the French
Emperor gained military glory and prestige; the King of Piedmont
was shortly to be amply repaid for his efforts by the aid of
Napoleon III. in his Italian policy. The Crimean War had this
further result that, showing the inefficiency of the Russian
Government, it was a main cause of the wave of reform which swept
over that country in the early years of the reign of Alexander II.
As a solution of the Eastern Question the War was a flat failure'.'
But even if the reform in Russia touched many institutions it cer- '
tainly did not become general, for Wallace in speaking of
Sebastopol, the city of the great siege, says:
"At the time of my visit, in 1873, the town was still in
pretty nearly the same dilapidated condition as when the allies
left it. The streets, had of course, been cleared, but the great
majority of the houses were still roofless and in ruins, and there
was a general air of desolation about the place, as if the siege
had just been finished and the inhabitants had not yet had time to
return to their homes.
Yet Wallace declares that the intellectual and moral improvement
in Russia due to the war was very great.^ The improvement would
have had to be revolutionary in character to bring Russian con-
ditions to anything like the standard in Western Europe.
Again the treaty did not establish a lasting peace; for
Europe, though relatively free from war for more than a generation
57. Hazen, Europe Since 1875, p. 616.
58. Wallace, Russia
, p. 456.
59. Ibid., p. 457.
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before the Crimean war, was forced to bear the burden of five
cruel wars within twenty-five years after it was signed. But it
is not correct to judge the treaty as a failure because changes
came in rapid succession immediately after its ratification. It
was the treaty of Paris tnat paved the way for the unification o
Italy, and the decline of Austria. And these two great changes
could not take place without bringing about two others equally
important - tne loss of temporal power by the Pope and the
hegemony of Prussia.
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